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Abstract
Enrich-by-need protocol analysis is a style of symbolic protocol anal-
ysis that characterizes all executions of a protocol that extend a given
scenario. In effect, it computes a strongest security goal the protocol
achieves in that scenario. cpsa, a Cryptographic Protocol Shapes Ana-
lyzer, implements enrich-by-need protocol analysis.
In this paper, we describe how to analyze protocols using the Diffie-
Hellman mechanism for key agreement (DH) in the enrich-by-need style.
DH, while widespread, has been challenging for protocol analysis because
of its algebraic structure. DH essentially involves fields and cyclic groups,
which do not fit the standard foundational framework of symbolic protocol
analysis. By contrast, we justify our analysis via an algebraically natural
model.
This foundation makes the extended cpsa implementation reliable.
Moreover, it provides informative and efficient results.
An appendix, written by John Ramsdell in 2014, explains how unifi-
cation is efficiently done in our framework.
∗Email: mliskov, guttman, ramsdell, prowe@mitre.org
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1 Introduction
Diffie-Hellman key agreement (DH) [9], while widely used, has been challenging
for mechanized security protocol analysis. Some techniques, e.g. [13, 8, 30,
23], have produced informative results, but focus only on proving or disproving
individual protocol security goals. A protocol and a specific protocol goal are
given as inputs. If the tool terminates, it either proves that this goal is achieved,
or else provides a counterexample. However, constructing the right security
goals for a protocol requires a high level of expertise.
By contrast, the enrich-by-need approach starts from a protocol and some
scenario of interest. For instance, if the initiator has had a local session, with a
peer whose long-term secret is uncompromised, what other local sessions have
occurred? What session parameters must they agree on? Must they have hap-
pened recently, or could they be stale?
Enrich-by-need protocol analysis identifies all essentially different small-
est executions compatible with the scenario of interest. While there are in-
finitely many possible executions—since we put no bound on the number of
local sessions—often surprisingly few of them are really different. The Crypto-
graphic Protocol Shapes Analyzer (cpsa) [35], a symbolic protocol analysis tool
based on strand spaces [40, 16, 25], efficiently enumerates these minimal, essen-
tially different executions. We call the minimal, essentially different executions
the protocol’s shapes for the given scenario.
Knowing the shapes tells us a strongest relevant security goal, i.e. a formula
that expresses authentication and confidentiality trace properties, and is at least
as strong as any one the protocol achieves in that scenario [18, 34]. Using these
shapes, one can resolve specific protocol goals. The hypothesis of a proposed
security goal tells us what scenario to consider, after which we can simply check
whether the conclusion holds in each resulting shape (see [37] for a precise logical
treatment).
Moreover, enrich-by-need has key advantages. Because it can also compute
strongest goal formulas directly for different protocols, it allows comparing the
strength of different protocols [37], for instance during standardization. More-
over, the shapes provide the designer with visualizations of exactly what the
protocol may do in the presence of an adversary. Thus, they make protocol
analysis more widely accessible, being informative even for those whose exper-
tise is not mechanized protocol analysis.
In this paper, we show how we strengthened cpsa’s enrich-by-need analysis
to handle DH. It is efficient, and has a flexible adversary model with corruptions.
Foundational issues needed to be resolved. For one thing, finding solutions
to equations in the natural underlying theories is undecidable in general, which
means that mechanized techniques must be carefully circumscribed. For an-
other, these theories, which include fields, are different from many others in
security protocol analysis. The field axioms are not (conditional) equations,
meaning that they do not have a simplest (or “initial”) model for the analy-
sis to work within. Much work on mechanized protocol analysis, even for DH,
which relies on equational theories and their initial models, e.g. [13, 8, 30, 23].
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However, one would like an analysis method to have an explicit theory justify-
ing it relative to the standard mathematical structures such as fields. cpsa now
has a transparent foundation in the algebraic properties of the fields that DH
manipulates. This development extends our earlier work [12, 24].
Contributions. In this paper, we describe how we extended cpsa to analyze
DH protocols. Our method is currently restricted to protocols that do not use
addition in the exponents, which is a large class. We call these multiplicative
protocols. The method is also restricted to protocols that disclose randomly
chosen exponents one-by-one. This allows modeling a wide range of possible
types of corruption; however, it excludes a few protocols in which products
of exponents are disclosed. We say that a protocol separates disclosures if it
satisfies our condition.
cpsa’s analysis is based on two principles—Lemmas 4 and 5—that are valid
for all executions of a protocol Π, if Π is multiplicative and separates disclosures.
They characterize how the adversary can obtain an exponent value such as xy
or an exponentiated DH value such as gxy, resp. They tell cpsa what informa-
tion to add to a partial analysis to get one or more possible enrichments that
describe the different executions in which the adversary obtains these values.
Lemmas 11–12 show how cpsa represents the enrichments.
To formulate and prove these lemmas, we had to clarify the algebraic struc-
tures we work with. In our semantics, the messages in protocol executions
contain mathematical objects such as elements of fields and cyclic groups. We
regard the the random choices of the compliant protocol participants serve as
“transcendentals,” i.e. primitive elements added to a base field that have no al-
gebraic relationship to members of the base field. The adversary cannot rely on
any particular algebraic relations with known values before the compliant par-
ticipant has made the random choice. Even after the choice of a value x, if the
adversary sees only the exponentiated value gx, the adversary still does not know
any algebraic (polynomial) constraints on x. Instead, as in the Generic Group
Model [39, 29], the adversary can apply algebraic operations to such values, but
cannot benefit from the bitstrings by means of which they are represented.
cpsa’s analysis operates within a language of first order predicate logic. The
analysis relates to real protocol executions via Tarski-style satisfaction. Protocol
executions (using group and field elements as messages, in the presence of an
adversary) are the models of the theories used in the analysis process. This
provides a familiar foundational setting.
cpsa is very efficient. When executed on a rich set of variants of Internet
Key Exchange (IKE) versions 1 and 2, our analysis required less than 30 seconds
on a laptop. By contrast, Scyther analyzed this same set of IKE variants,
requiring about a day of work on a computing cluster [7]. This is about 3.4
orders of magnitude more time, quite apart from the difference between the
quite powerful cluster (circa 2010) and the laptop (built circa 2015). Another
benchmark [4] with little use of DH led to similar results. This suggests that
cpsa is broadly efficient, with or without DH. Performance data for Tamarin
and Maude-NPA is less available.
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where init computes K as KCFA(a, x, gb, gβ)
resp computes K as KCFB(b, y, ga, gα)
Figure 1: Protocol DHCR: Initiator, responder, and ltx() self-certifying roles.
The certs are [[ gltx(A) ]]sk(P ) and [[ g
ltx(B) ]]sk(P ) for each role.
2 An example: Unified Model
Many variants of the original Diffie-Hellman idea [9] exchange both certified,
long-term values ga and gb, and also one-time, ephemeral values gx and gy. The
peers agree compute session keys using key computation functions KCF(·), where
in successful sessions, KCFA(a, x, gb, gy) = KCFB(b, y, ga, gx). The ephemeral
values ensure the two parties agree on a different key in each session. The long-
term values are intended for authentication, namely that any party that obtains
the session key must be one of the intended peers. Different functions KCF(·)
yield different security properties. Protocol analysis tools for DH key exchanges
must be able to use algebraic properties to identify these security consequences.
2.1 DH Challenge-Response with Unified Model keying
We consider here a simple DH Challenge-Response protocol DHCR in which
nonces from each party form a challenge and response protected by a shared,
derived DH key (see Fig. 1).
Each participant obtains two self-signed certificates, covering the long term
public values of his peer and himself. A and B’s long-term DH exponents are
values ltx(A), ltx(B), which we will mainly write as a lower case a, b. We assume
that the principals are in bijection with distinct long-term ltx(·) values.
Each participant furnishes an ephemeral public DH value gx, gy in cleartext,
and also a nonce. Each participant receives a value which may be the peer’s
ephemeral, or may instead be some value selected by an active adversary. Nei-
ther participant can determine the exponent for the ephemeral value he receives,
but since the value is a group element, it must be some value of the form gα, gβ .
Each participant computes a session key using his KCF(·). The responder
uses the key to encrypt the nonce received together with his own nonce. The
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initiator uses the key to decrypt this package, and to retransmit the responder’s
nonce in plaintext as a confirmation.
The registration role allows any principal P to emit its long-term public
group value gltx(P ) under its own digital signature. In full-scale protocols, a
certifying authority’s signature would be used, but in this example omit the CA
so as not to distract from the core DH issues.
We will assume that each instance of a role chooses its values for certain
parameters freshly. For instance, each instance of the registration role makes
a fresh choice of ltx(P ). Each instance of the initiator role chooses x and na
freshly, and each responder instance chooses y and nb freshly.
This protocol is parameterized by the key computations. We consider three
key computations from the Unified Model [1], with a hash function #(·) stand-
ing for key derivation. The shared keys—when each participant receives the
ephemeral value gα = gx or gβ = gy that the peer sent—are:
Plain UM: #(gab, gxy);
Criss-cross UMX: #(gay, gbx);
Three-component UM3: #(gay, gbx, gxy)
We discuss three security properties:
Authentication: If either the initiator or responder completes the protocol,
and both principals’ private long-term exponents are secret, then the in-
tended peer must have participated in a matching conversation.
All three key computations UM, UMX, and UM3 enforce the authentication
goal.
Impersonation resistance: If either the initiator or responder completes the
protocol, and the intended peer’s private long-term exponent is secret,
then the intended peer must have participated in a matching conversation.
Here we do not assume that ones own private long-term exponent is secret. Can
the adversary impersonate the intended peer if ones own key is compromised?
DHCR with the plain UM KCF is susceptible to an impersonation attack:
An attacker who knows Alice’s own long-term exponent can impersonate any
partner to Alice. The adversary can calculate gab from a and gb, and can
calculate the gxy value from gx and a y it chooses itself.
On the other hand, the UMX and UM3 KCFs resist the impersonation at-
tack.
Forward secrecy: If the intended peers complete a protocol session and then
the private, long-term exponent of each party is exposed subsequently,
then the adversary still cannot derive the session key.
This is sometimes called weak forward secrecy.
To express forward secrecy, we allow the registration role to continue and sub-
sequently disclose the long term secret ltx(P ) as in Fig. 2. If we assume in an
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Figure 2: The registration role in full
analysis that ltx(P ) is uncompromised, that implies that this role does not com-
plete. The dummy second node allows specifying that the ltx(P ) release node
occurs after some other event, generally the completion of a normal session.
The Normal UM KCF guarantees forward secrecy, but UMX does not. In
UMX, if an adversary records both gx and gy during the protocol and learns
a and b later, the adversary can compute the key by exponentiating gx to the
power b and gy to the power a.
UM3 restores forward secrecy. It meets all three goals.
2.2 Strand terminology
In discussing how cpsa carries out its analysis, we will use a small amount of
the strand space terminology; see Section 4 for more detail.
We call a sequence of transmission and reception events as illustrated in
Figs. 1–2 a strand. We call each send-event or receive-event on a strand a node.
We draw strands either horizontally as in Figs. 1–2 or vertically, as in diagrams
generated by cpsa itself.
A protocol consists of a finite set of these strands, which we call the roles
of the protocol. The roles contain variables, called the parameters of the roles,
and by plugging in values for the parameters, we obtain a set of strands called
the instances of the roles. We also call a strand a regular strand when it is an
instance of a role, because it then complies with the rules. Regular nodes are
the nodes that lie on regular strands. We speak of a regular principal associated
with a secret if that secret is used only in accordance with the protocol, i.e. only
in regular strands.
In an execution, events are (at least) partially ordered, and values sent on
earlier transmissions are available to the adversary, who would like to provide
the messages expected by the regular participants on later transmission nodes.
The adversary can also generate primitive values on his own. We will make
assumptions restricting which values the adversary does generate to express
various scenarios and security goals.
2.3 How CPSA works, I: UMX initiator
Here we will illustrate the main steps that cpsa takes when analyzing DHCR.
For this illustration, we will focus on the impersonation resistance of the UMX
key computation, in the case where the initiator role runs, aiming to ensure
that the responder has also taken at least the first three steps of a matching
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Figure 3: Skeleton 0: The initial scenario, assuming ltx(B) non-compromised
and A 6= B. cpsa exploration tree
run. The last step of the responder is a reception, so the initiator can never
infer that it has occurred. We choose this case because it is typical, yet quite
compact.
Starting point. We start cpsa on the problem shown in Fig. 3, in which A,
playing the initiator role, has made a full local run of the protocol, and received
the long term public value of B from a genuine run of the ltx-gen role. These
are shown as the vertical column on the left and the single transmission node
at the top to its right. We will assume that B’s private value ltx(B) is non-
compromised and freshly generated, so that the public value gltx(B) originates
only at this point. In particular, this run definitely does not progress to expose
the secret as in the third node of Fig. 2. The fresh selection of ltx(B) must
certainly precede the reception of gltx(B) at the beginning of the initiator’s run.
This is the meaning of the dashed arrow between them. We do not assume that
A’s long term secret ltx(A) is uncompromised, although we will assume that the
ephemeral x value is freshly generated by the initiator run, and not available to
the adversary. We assume A 6= B, which is the case of most interest.
Exploration tree. In Fig. 3, we also show the exploration tree that cpsa
generates. Each item in the tree—we will call each item a skeleton—is a scenario
describing some behavior of the regular protocol participants, as well as some
assumptions. For instance, skeleton 0 contains the assumptions about ltx(B)
and A’s ephemeral value x mentioned before. The exploration tree contains one
blue, bold face entry, skeleton 1 (shown in Fig. 4), as well as a subtree starting
from 2 that is all red. The bold blue skeleton 1 is a shape, meaning it describes
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Figure 4: Skeleton 1, the sole resulting shape. Skeleton 2: Can the UMX
encryption key K be exposed, on the rightmost strand?
a simplest possible execution that satisfies the starting skeleton 0. The red
skeletons are dead skeletons, meaning possibilities that the search has excluded;
no executions can occur that satisfy these skeletons. Thus, skeleton 1 is the
only shape, and cpsa has concluded that all executions that satisfy skeleton 0
in fact also satisfy skeleton 1.
In other examples, there may be several shapes identified by the analysis, or
in fact zero shapes. The latter means that the initial scenario cannot occur in
any execution. This may be the desired outcome, for instance when the initial
scenario exhibits some disclosure that the protocol designer would like to ensure
is prevented.
First step. cpsa, starting with skeleton 0 in Fig. 3, identifies the third node of
the initiator strand, which is shown in red, as unexplained. This is the initiator
receiving the DH ephemeral public value gy and the encryption {|na, nb|}K ,
where K is the session key A computes using gy and the other parameters.
The node is red because the adversary cannot supply this message on his own,
given the materials we already know that the regular, compliant principals have
transmitted. Thus, cpsa is looking for additional information, including other
transmissions of regular participants, that could explain it. Two possibilities
are relevant here, and they lead to skeletons 1 and 2 (see Fig. 4).
In skeleton 1, a regular protocol participant executing the responder role
transmits the message gy, {|na, nb|}K . Given the values in this message—including
those used to compute K using the UMX function—all of the parameters in the
responder role are determined. It is executed by the intended peer B, who is
preparing the message for A, with matching values for the nonces and ephemeral
exponents. These are matching conversations [5, 27]. A solid arrow from one
node to another means that the former precedes the latter, and moreover it
transmits the same message that the latter receives.
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Figure 5: Skeleton 4: gbx/w, w is on the rightmost strand. Is there an exposed
exponent w where either w = bx or else gbx/w was sent by a regular participant?
Skeleton 2 considers whether the key K = #(gay, gbx), computed by the
initiator, might be compromised. K is the value received on the rightmost
strand. The reception node is called a listener node, because it witnesses for the
availability of K to the adversary. The “heard” value K is then retransmitted
so that cpsa can register that this event must occur before the initiator’s third
node. This listener node is red because cpsa cannot yet explain how K would
become available. However, if additional information, such as more actions of
the regular participants, would explain it, then the adversary could use K to
encrypt na, nb and forge the value A receives. Thus, skeleton 2 identifies this
listener node for further exploration.
Step 2. Proceeding from skeleton 2, cpsa performs a simplification on K =
#(gay, gbx). The value y is available to the adversary, as is a, since we have not
assumed them uncompromised. Thus, gay is available. The adversary will be
able to compute K if he can obtain gbx. Skeleton 3 (not shown) is similar to
skeleton 2 but has a red node asking cpsa to explain how to obtain gbx.
This requires a step which is distinctive to DH protocols. cpsa adds Skele-
ton 4, which has a new rightmost strand with a red node, receiving the pair
gbx/w, w. To resolve this, cpsa must meet two constraints. First, it must choose
an exponent w that can be exposed and available to the adversary. Second, for
this value of w, either w = bx or else the “leftover” DH value gbx/w must be
transmitted by a regular participant and extracted by the adversary.
One of our key lemmas, Lemma 5, justifies this step.
Step 3, clean-up. From skeleton 4, cpsa considers the remaining possibilities
in this branch of its analysis. First, it immediately eliminates the possibility
w = bx, since the protocol offers no way for the adversary to obtain b and x.
In fact, because b and x are random values, independently chosen by different
principals, the adversary cannot obtain their product without obtaining the
values themselves.
cpsa then considers each protocol role in turn, namely the initiator, respon-
der, and registration roles. Can any role transmit a DH value of the form gbx/w,
where the resulting inferred value for w would be available to the adversary?
10
In skeleton 5, it considers the case in which the initiator strand is the original
starting strand, which transmits gx. Thus, x = bx/w, which is to say w = b.
However, since b is assumed uncompromised, the adversary cannot obtain it,
and this branch is dead. Skeleton 6 explores the case where a different initiator
strand sends gz, so z = bx/w, i.e. w = bx/z. However, this is unobtainable,
since it too is compounded from independent, uncompromised values b, x, z.
Skeleton 7 considers the responder case, and skeletons 8 and 9 consider a
registration strand which is either identical with the initial one (skeleton 8) or
not (skeleton 9). They are eliminated for corresponding reasons.
The entire analysis takes about 0.2 second.
CPSA overall algorithm. In this paper, unlike earlier work, a skeleton for Π
will be a theory that a set of executions satisfies. This may be the empty set of
executions, in which case the skeleton is “dead,” like skeletons 2–9.
Protocol analysis in cpsa starts with a skeleton, the initial scenario. At any
step, cpsa has a set S of skeletons available. If S is empty, the run is complete.
Otherwise, cpsa selects a skeleton A from S. If A is realized, meaning that
it gives a full description of some execution, then cpsa records it as a result.
Otherwise, there is some reception node n within A that is not explained. This
n is the target node. That means that cpsa cannot show how the message
received by n could be available, given the actions the adversary can perform
on his own, or using messages received from earlier transmissions.
cpsa replaces A with a “cohort.” This is a set C1, . . . ,Ck of extensions of
the theory A. For every execution satisfying A, there should be at least one of
the Ci which this execution satisfies. cpsa must not “lose” executions. When
k = 0 and there are no cohort members, cpsa has recognized that A is dead.
cpsa then repeats this process starting with S \ {A} ∪ {C1, . . . ,Ck}.
CPSA cohort selection. cpsa generates its cohorts by adding one or more
facts, or new equalities, to A, to generate each Ci. It also does some renaming,
so that the theories Ci result from a theory interpretation from A rather than
syntactic extension.
The selection of facts to add is based on a taxonomy of the executions satis-
fying A. In each one of them, the reception on the target node n must somehow
be explained. There are only a limited number of types of explanation, which
are summarized in Fig. 6. Of these types, the first three are entirely unchanged.
The Specialization clause is conceptually unchanged, but the unification algo-
rithm that finds the relevant equations has been updated to reflect the DH
algebra; it works efficiently in practice (see Section 4.3 below).
The last two clauses are new. Lemmas 5 and 4 justify them (resp.), and
Cohort Cases 11 and 12 formulate how the skeletons Ci are defined from A;
in these cases they are in fact syntactic extensions. We will push the overall
Theorem 2 into the Appendix (p. 44) to concentrate on these central cases.
We now briefly mention the types of step we have not yet illustrated.
A decryption step. One must also handle a case dual to the encryption
principle we used in step 1 above, leading from skeleton 0 to skeletons 1,2, but
concerning decryption.
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Regular transmission: Some principal, acting in accordance with the protocol
(i.e. “regularly”), has transmitted a message in this execution which is not de-
scribed in A.
Skeleton 1 was introduced in this way in step 1 above.
Encryption key available: An encrypted value in a reception must be explained,
and the adversary obtains the encryption key in a way that cpsa will subse-
quently explore.
Skeleton 2 was introduced in this way in step 1 above.
Decryption key available: A value was previously transmitted in encrypted form,
and, in a way that cpsa will subsequently explore, the adversary obtains the
decryption key to extract it.
Specialization: The execution satisfies additional equations, not included in A, and
in this special case the adversary can obtain the target node message.
DH value computed: The adversary needs to supply a DH value gα, and obtains
it from gα/w by exponentiating with w, which must also be available.
Skeleton 4 was introduced in this way in step 2 above.
Exponent value computed: The adversary must obtain an exponent xw. There
are then two subcases:
1. Both x and w will be obtainable in ways that cpsa will subsequently
explore; or
2. w will be instantiated as some v/x, so that x will cancel out. Thus, x is
in fact be absent from the instance of xw.
Figure 6: Kinds of cohort members.
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Consider the analysis from the responder’s point of view. In this scenario,
the responder’s last step, in which he receives the decrypted nonce nb, needs
explanation. The responder previously transmitted it inside the encryption in
gy, {|na, nb|}K . In this case, cpsa must explain the how nb can escape from the
protection of the encryption.
One possible explanation is that a regular transmission does so. That is, in
some role of the protocol, a participant accepts messages of the form {|na, nb|}K ,
and retransmits the second nonce outside this form. This is symmetric to the
case with an initiator strand, leading to a shape very similar to skeleton 1.
The other possible explanation is that the adversary obtains the key K =
#(gay, gbx). This would allow the adversary to do the decryption, and free nb
from its protection. The analysis of the resulting skeleton 12 is almost identical
with the analysis of skeleton 2 in Section 2.3.
A step for exponents. When cpsa needs to explore the availability of some
exponent value, such as bx/z in an example above, it may be able to resolve
the question directly. When it cannot, it takes a step based on our other key
lemma, Lemma 4. This involves splitting the exploration tree, i.e. distinguishing
possible cases. In one branch, variables will be instantiated so that an element
such as b in the exponent will be canceled out. The other branch explores
whether the same element b can be available to the adversary. cpsa resorts to
this step relatively rarely when a protocol uses DH in straightforward ways; the
forward secrecy analysis for the plain UM key computation gives an example
however.
2.4 Performance
Our implementation of the cpsa tool is highly efficient. See Figure 7 for a list of
performance results. We ran the tool not only on the Diffie-Hellman challenge-
response protocol described in this section, with each of the key derivation
options, but also on a rich set of variants of Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
versions 1 and 2. Cremers’ Scyther tool was used circa 2010 to analyze this
same set of variants [8]. The IKE variants were analyzed for an average of five
properties each, yielding conclusions similar to those drawn using Scyther [8].
Scyther can thus be used as a basis for performance comparison. The authors
reported that the analysis of the IKE variants took about a day of work on a
computing cluster.
In contrast, cpsa needed no more than 1.36 seconds to analyze any of the
individual variants, and 21.32 seconds to analyze all of them combined. The
data in Fig. 7 is from a run of cpsa on a mid-2015 MacBook Pro with a 4-core
2.2 GHz Intel Core i7 processor, run with up to 8 parallel threads using the
Haskell run-time system.
Our analysis of the Diffie-Hellman challenge response protocol revealed the
properties we expected, as described earlier in this section. Each cpsa run
checked about five scenarios, considering the guarantees obtained by initiator
and responder each under two sets of assumptions, as well as a forward secrecy
13
DHCR: Example & Time
dhcr-um 4.06s dhcr-umx 0.72s dhcr-um3 0.47s
IKEv1: Example & Time
IKEv1-pk2-a 1.06s IKEv1-pk2-a2 1.02s
IKEv1-pk2-m 0.49s IKEv1-pk2-m2 0.58s
IKEv1-pk-a1 1.27s IKEv1-pk-a12 1.09s
IKEv1-pk-a2 1.00s IKEv1-pk-a22 1.10s
IKEv1-pk-m 0.51s IKEv1-pk-m2 0.49s
IKEv1-psk-a 0.43s IKEv1-psk-m 0.68s
IKEv1-psk-m-perlman 0.69s IKEv1-quick 0.66s
IKEv1-psk-quick-noid 0.65s IKEv1-quick-nopfs 0.09s
IKEv1-sig-a1 0.15s IKEv1-sig-a2 0.16s
IKEv1-sig-a-perlman 0.17s IKEv1-sig-a-perlman2 0.19s
IKEv1-sig-m 0.21s IKEv1-sig-m-perlman 0.19s
IKEv2: Example & Time
IKEv2-eap 1.35s IKEv2-eap2 1.36s
IKEv2-mac 0.76s IKEv2-mac2 0.97s
IKEv2-mac-to-sig 0.83s IKEv2-mac-to-sig2 0.82s
IKEv2-sig 0.56s IKEv2-sig2 0.54s
IKEv2-sig-to-mac 0.70s IKEv2-sig-to-mac2 0.69s
Figure 7: cpsa Timings: DHCR-UM*, Internet Key Exchange v. 1 and 2.
property. Our analysis of the IKE variants discovered no novel attacks, but
does sharpen Cremers’ analysis, because cpsa reflects the algebraic properties
of Diffie-Hellman natively, while Scyther emulated some properties of Diffie-
Hellman.
We turn now to the task of identifying the foundational ideas that will justify
protocol analysis in the efficient style we have just illustrated.
3 Algebraic and logical context
We first examine the mathematical objects on which Diffie-Hellman relies (Sec-
tion 3.1), and we then consider how to represent tupling and cryptographic
operations above them (Section 3.2).
3.1 The algebraic context
Diffie-Hellman operations act in a cyclic subgroup C of a enclosing group G. In
the original formulation, the enclosing group G is the multiplicative group Z∗p
modulo a large prime p; since 0 does not participate in the multiplicative group,
this has an even number of members, namely p− 1. If q is a prime that divides
p− 1 and g is a typical member of Z∗p, then Z∗p contains a cyclic subgroup Cq of
order q generated by the powers of g to integers mod q. Since q is prime, the
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integers mod q form a field Fq, where the field operations are addition modulo
q and multiplication mod q.
Thus, generally, consider an enclosing group G and a large prime q. We are
interested in the field Fq and a cyclic group C generated by the powers gx of
some g ∈ G exponentiated to field elements x ∈ Fq. We will assume that the Gs
are chosen (or represented) so that, given gx ∈ C, it is algorithmically hard to
recover x, and, more specifically, the following problems are hard:
Computational DH assumption: given gx and gy, generated from randomly
chosen x, y ∈ Fq, to find gxy; and
Decisional DH assumption: given gx and gy, generated with randomly cho-
sen x, y ∈ Fq, to distinguish gxy from gz, where z ∈ Fq is independently
randomly chosen.
We will work in a model in which the adversary can apply the group operation
to known group elements; can apply the field operations to known field elements;
and can exponentiate a known group value to a field value. As in the generic
group model [39, 29], we regard the structures as otherwise opaque to the adver-
sary. In [3], Barthe et al. show that the generic group model, which is expressed
in probabilistic terms, justifies a non-probabilistic adversary model in which the
adversary must solve equations using only the given algebraic operations. We
will follow their strategy.
Adversary model. The job of the adversary is to construct counterexamples
to security goals of the system. In the framework we will use [18, 36], a security
goal is an implication Φ =⇒ Ψ, so the adversary, to provide a counterexample,
will offer a structure in which Φ is satisfied, but Ψ is not.
For instance, the goal may be an authentication property, in which case Φ
may say that one party (the initiator, e.g.) has executed a run with certain fresh
values and uncompromised keys. We will call a participant that is following the
protocol a regular participant. The system’s goal Ψ may then say that a regular
responder run matches this regular initiator run. The adversary will want to
exhibit a situation in which there is no such matching run.
If the goal is a non-disclosure goal, then Φ may say that one party (the
initiator, e.g.) has executed a run with certain fresh values and uncompromised
keys; has computed a particular session key k; and that same value k has been
observed unprotected on the network. In this case, any structure that satisfies
Φ is a counterexample; Ψ doesn’t matter, and can be the always-false formula
⊥.
Hence, the adversary must ensure that certain equations are satisfied. For
instance, in the non-disclosure goal just mentioned, the adversary must ensure
that the session key k computed by the initiator is equal to the key observed
on the network. The adversary must also ensure, for each message received by
a regular participant, either that it is obtained from an earlier transmission, or
else that the adversary can compute it with the help of earlier transmissions.
This condition also requires solving equations: The adversary must obtain or
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compute values that will equal the messages that the regular participants are
assumed to receive.
Thus, the core of the adversary’s job is to solve equations by transforming
the transmissions of the regular participants via a set of computational abilities.
These include the ability to encrypt given key and plaintext; to decrypt given
decryption key and ciphertext; and to execute exponentiation and the algebraic
operations of the group and field. We codify this as a game between the system
and the adversary.
1. The system chooses a security goal Φ =⇒ Ψ, involving secrecy, authenti-
cation, key compromise, etc., as in Section 2.
2. The adversary proposes a potential counterexample A consisting of local
regular runs with equations between values in reception of transmission
events, e.g. an equation between session keys as computed by two partic-
ipants, or a regular participant and a disclosed value.
3. For each message reception node in A, the adversary chooses a recipe,
intended to produce an acceptable message, using the computational abil-
ities. The adversary may use earlier transmission events on regular strands
to build messages for subsequent reception events.
These recipes determine a set of equalities between the values computed by
the adversary and the values “expected” by the recipient (i.e. acceptable
to the recipient). They are the adversary’s proposed equations.
4. The adversary wins if his proposed equations are valid in Fq, for infinitely
many primes q.
Concentrating on the field values, if the proposed equations are valid, then
whatever choices the regular participants make for their random exponents, the
adversary’s recipes should establish the equalities. In effect, the adversary is
choosing recipes before the regular participants choose their exponents. For
this reason, we regard the choices of the regular participants as field extension
elements. Thus, we will now introduce field structures, and mention how they
may be extended with new extension elements.
Fields and their cyclic groups. We use (fld,0,1,+,−, ·, /) as the signature
for fields; fld is the sole sort. The field theory contains the axioms:
1. + and · are associative and commutative, and satisfy the distributive law;
2. 0 is an identity element for + and 1 is an identity element for ·;
3. − is inverse to +; and
4. ∀x, y : fld . y 6= 0 =⇒ (x/y)·y = x.
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A structure for this signature is said to be a field iff it satisfies these axioms.
We augment the field signature to introduce the cyclic group structure:
ΣG = (fld,grp,0,1,+,−, ·, /,g, exp),
where g has arity ()→ grp and exp has arity grp×fld→ grp. Cyclic groups
satisfy the axioms:
1. ∀h : grp . ∃x : fld . exp(g, x) = h;
2. ∀x, y : fld . exp(g, x) = exp(g, y) implies x = y;
3. ∀h : grp . exp(h,1) = h; and
4. ∀h : grp, x, y : fld . exp(exp(h, x), y) = exp(h, (x · y)).
We will use familiar notations, writing e.g. (hx)y = hxy for the body of the last
cyclic group axiom. The first two axioms ensure that exp(g, ·) is a bijection
between the field and the group. The third axiom fixes how this bijection acts
on scalars in the field, e.g. rationals in Q. Since we can always write group
operations by adding the exponents, we have no separate group operation in
the signature. The group identity element is g0.
In this paper, we will in fact consider only protocols Π in which the regular
participants use only the sub-signature (fld,1, ·, /). That is, they never use the
additive structure 0,+,− in Π. We have proved that if the regular participants
do not use the additive structure, then the advesary will never need it either.
Every attack the adversary can achieve against such a protocol Π, the adversary
can achieve using only the multiplicative structure [24].
However, our conclusions about these protocols are motivated by the natural
underlying mathematical structures, namely the fields and the cyclic groups on
which they act.
Transcendentals. We can always extend a given field F with new elements
x1, . . . , xn; the extended field, written F(x1, . . . , xn), is then generated from
the polynomials Pi in x1, . . . , xn with coefficients from F . Specifically, the
members of F(x1, . . . , xn) come from the rational expressions P1/P2 where P2
is not the identically 0 polynomial. Two rational expressions represent the same
field element when the usual rules for polynomial multiplication (or factoring)
and cancellation imply that they are equal. The field elements are thus the
equivalence classes of rational expressions partitioned by these rules.
In algebra, one is concerned with two kinds of field extension elements. Al-
gebraic extension elements are introduced with a polynomial of which the new
element will be a root. For instance, the rationals Q have no square root of two,
Q has a proper algebraic extension Q(x) where x is subjected to the polynomial
x2−2. Alternatively, a field extension may not be subjected to any polynomial.
This is of course necessary to introduce transcendental numbers such as pi and
e, since they are not roots of any polynomial with coefficients from Q. These
unconstrained field extension elements are called transcendentals.
17
We will use transcendental field extension elements to represent the ran-
domly chosen exponents of the regular participants in protocol runs. This has
the consequence: If an adversary’s proposed equations include some P1 = P2
involving a transcendental x, then it will be true in a field F only if P1 − P2 is
identically 0 in F . This matches our winning condition Clause 4, at least for F .
The rationals Q. We will focus on the base field Q, since a polynomial P1 is
identically 0 in Q iff there are infinitely many primes q such that P1 is identically
0 in Fq. Certainly, if P1 is 0 in Q, it is 0 in every Fq, which can only add
equations, not eliminate them. On the other hand, a polynomial of degree d
can have at most d zeros in any field. Thus, if P1 is identically 0 over Fq but
not over Q, then q ≤ d. However, since every polynomial has finite degree, there
are only finitely many such exceptions q.
Definition 1 Fix an infinite set of transcendentals trsc. Define:
ΣF to be the signature ΣD augmented with a sort trsc, with the sort inclusion
trsc≤ fld;
F to be the field Q(trsc) of rational expressions in trsc;
C to be the cyclic group generated from F by exp.
F and C furnish an algebra of the signature ΣF .
3.2 Building messages
Signatures, algebras, and structures. As we have just illustrated, our mes-
sages form certain order sorted algebras [15], although we will not need explicitly
overloaded symbols. An order sorted signature is a triple Σ = (S,≤, ::) where:
S is a set of sort names;
≤ is a partial order on S; and
:: is a finite map. Its domain is a finite set of function constants, and it returns
an arity s1× . . .×sk → s0 for each of those function constants f . We write
f :: s1× . . .× sk → s0 to assert that the arity of f in Σ is s1× . . .× sk → s0.
The function symbols of Σ form the domain dom(::); c ∈ dom(::) is an individual
constant if it has zero argument sorts c :: ()→ s0, or as we will write c :: s0.
A structure A is a Σ-algebra iff
1. A supplies a set s(A) for each sort s in S, where
2. s1 ≤ s2 implies s1(A) ⊆ s2(A);
3. If s1(A) ∩ s2(A) 6= ∅ then for some sort s ∈ S, s ≤ s1 and s ≤ s2; and
4. A supplies a function fA : s1(A) × . . . × sk(A) → s0(A) for each function
symbol f :: s1 × . . .× sk → s0.
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We assume (Clause 3) that sorts overlap only if they share a common subsort;
when s1 ≤ s2, then s1 is itself a common subsort.
Strictly speaking, the algebra is the map that associates each sort s to its
interpretation s(A) and each function symbol f to its interpretation fA. We
will often speak as if the algebra is the range of the interpretation, but we will
make use of the map wherever needed, e.g. in Section 5.1.
A homomorphism H : A → B is a sort respecting map from the domains of A
to the domains of B that respects the function symbols: fB(H(v1), . . . ,H(vk)) =
H(fA(v1, . . . , vk)).
We construct our message algebras in two steps. We first start with basic
values that include the field F and cyclic group C, as well as other convenient
values such as names, nonces, texts and keys. We will then freely build messages
above these basic values via tupling and cryptographic operations such as en-
cryption, hashing, and digital signature. We will refer to the algebra generated
from basic values by these free constructors as a constructed algebra.
What we claim here is true regardless of the exact choice of constructors, and
of the “convenient” basic values we mention. Moreover, some of our claims are
unchanged as the structure of F , C is extended, as we will mention in connection
with future work. In the meantime, we will focus on a particular exemplar.
Basic algebra. Let:
S0 = {skey,name,text,akey,trsc,create, fld,grp,basic}
be a set of sorts, with trsc ≤ fld and skey,name,text,akey,trsc ≤
create. The adversary may create values of these sorts. To obtain other values
of field sort (for instance) she uses the constant 1 and the field operations.
The sort basic is the top sort; all other sorts are below it. Moreover, the
sorts skey,name,text,akey, fld,grp are all flat (hence by Clause 3 disjoint).
We also require function symbols:
inv :: akey→ akey pk :: name→ akey ltk :: name× name→ skey
to take the inverse of an asymmetric key (namely the other member of a pub-
lic/private key pair); to associate a public key with a name; and to associate
a long term shared symmetric key with a pair of names. We will refer to this
signature as Σb.
Definition 2 Fix a Σb algebra Mb containing F , C satisfying the field and group
axioms, and infinitely many values of each sort skey,name,text,akey, sat-
isfying the three axioms:
1. that inverse satisfies inv(inv(k)) = k;
2. pk, ltk are injective; and
3. every member of basic is in one of the subsorts skey, name, text, akey,
fld, grp.
Strictly speaking, the algebra is the map from Σb into Mb.
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Rule Premises ` Concl.
τ -↑ m1, . . . ,mi ` τ(m1, . . . ,mi)
{| · |}a· -↑ m,K ` {|m|}aK
{| · |}s· -↑ m,K ` {|m|}sK
τj-↓ τ(m1, . . . ,mi) ` mj for each 1 ≤ j ≤ i
{| · |}a· -↓ {|m|}aK ,K−1 ` m
{| · |}s· -↓ {|m|}sK ,K ` m
Figure 8: Derivability rules for free constructors
Message algebras. Having built the basic part of the algebra, we augment
it by applying free constructors for tupling and for cryptographic operations,
yielding values in a new top sort mesg. The exact set of operations is not
crucial; however, we assume that they are partitioned into:
Tupling operations τ(m1, . . . ,mi) where the mj are drawn from mesg and
the result is in mesg;
Asymmetric operations {|m|}aK for m in mesg and K : akey, yielding a re-
sult in mesg; and
Symmetric operations {|m|}sK for m,K : mesg, yielding a result in mesg.
We write {|m|}K when we do not care to distinguish {|m|}aK from {|m|}sK . We
call any unit {|m|}K an encryption, even though in practice they can be used as
hashes, digital signatures, and so on.
Multiple entries in each of these categories are useful, for instance: Multiple
tupling operations can represent distinct formats that cannot collide [31]; mul-
tiple asymmetric operations can represent encryption vs. digital signature; and
multiple symmetric operations can represent a cipher vs. a hash function.
We will illustrate our approach using a single asymmetric operator. We will
use a pair of symmetric operators representing a cipher and a hash function
#(m). We regard m as the key argument, the plaintext being some vacuous
value 0; i.e. #(m) = {|0|}sm. We use a single tupling operation of untagged
pairing (m1,m2).
Definition 3 Fix an extension Σc of Σb by augmenting Σb with a new top sort
mesg, and with the free pairing, symmetric, and asymmetric operators with
result sort mesg, as in the previous paragraph.
The Σc-algebra Mc is the closure of Mb under the (free) operators of Σc \Σb.
Strictly speaking, the algebra is the map from Σc into this closure.
We partition the operators as mentioned because the members of each par-
tition have corresponding rules for adversary derivability, displayed in Fig. 8.
These rules are either introduction rules, named operator-↑, or elimination rules,
named operator-↓. The adversary combines these rules to obtain messages.
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These have a weak Gentzen-style normalization property [14, 28, 32, 20].
Suppose that an elimination rule is used immediately after an introduction rule.
Unless the introduction rule is providing the decryption key for an application
of {| · |}s· -↓, the operator produced by the introduction rule must be the same as
the operator consumed by the elimination rule. In this case, the result of the
elimination rules is equal to one of the inputs to the introduction rule. Hence,
these pairs of rules provide the adversary nothing new, and we can assume they
do not occur.
The algebras Mb,Mc are ground algebras in the sense that they do not con-
tain any variables. Transcendentals in particular are not variables, but are
particular objects that help to make up fields of rational expressions. We will,
however, also consider objects that involve variables, namely linguistic terms
and formulas. However, even terms that contain no variables are not members
of Mc; they are simply linguistic terms that may refer to members of Mc.
3.3 Unification and Matching
cpsa’s good performance is due to the use of efficient algorithms for unification
and matching. Prior versions of cpsa had an algebra with just one equation—
the double inverse of an asymmetric key is the same as the key. It is straight-
forward to modify standard algorithms for syntactic unification and matching
to honor this equation.
In this implementation, the exponents satisfy AG , the equations for a free
Abelian group. There are efficient algorithms for unification modulo AG [2,
Section 5.1], and matching is equivalent to unification while treating some terms
as constants. cpsa uses an algorithm that reduces the problem to finding integer
solutions to an inhomogeneous linear equation with integer coefficients. The
equation solver used is from The Art of Computer Programming [22, Pg. 327],
and [33] provides an implementation of AG unification and matching in Haskell.
As expected, the implementation uses two sorts for exponents, with the sort
for transcendentals being a subsort of the one for exponents. The key obser-
vation is that there are no equations between transcendentals, thus syntactic
unification applies.
Section 6.1 of the Handbook [2] describes a general method for combining
unification algorithms. The method specifies making many non-deterministic
choices that would make unification expensive. We take advantage of the fact
that both syntactic and AG unification are relatively simple algorithms, and
using techniques explained in [21, 26], have a fast implementation of unifica-
tion and matching. Appendix B presents the algorithm. For more detail, see
Appendix B.
3.4 Logic: Languages and structures
Σ = (S,≤, ::, :::) is a first order signature iff:
(S,≤, ::) is an order sorted signature, and
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::: is a finite map from relation constants to arities s1 × . . . × sk from S. We
assume an equality symbol =s is in dom(:::) for each s ∈ S, with =s ::: s× s.
A first order language L = L(Σ,Var) is determined from a first order signature
and a set of variables. Given a supply of sorted variables Var with infinitely
many vi : s for each sort s ∈ S, L = L(Σ,Var) is the first order language with
terms and formulas defined inductively:
Terms of L: If s0 ≤ s, then each variable vi : s0 is a term of sort s.
If (i) t1 : s1, . . . , tk : sk are terms of the sorts shown, (ii) f ::s1×. . .×sk → s0
is a function symbol, and (iii) s0 ≤ s, then f(t1, . . . , tk) is a term of sort s.
Formulas of L: If (i) t1 : s1, . . . , tk : sk are terms of sorts shown, and (ii) R is
a relation symbol R ::: s1 × . . .× sk, then R(t1, . . . , tk) is a formula.
If φ and ψ are formulas, and x : s is a variable in Var(L), then:
φ ∨ ψ φ ∧ ψ φ =⇒ ψ ¬φ ∃x : s . φ ∀x : s . φ
are also formulas.
The occurrences of variables in terms and formulas are defined as usual, and
occurrences are bound if they are within the scope of a quantifier governing
that variable. We write term(L) for the terms of L; form(L) for the formulas of
L; and sent(L) for the formulas that are sentences, namely those in which no
variable has a free occurrence.
If we refer to L as a language over an order sorted signature (S,≤, ::), we
mean that it is a language over the first order signature (S,≤, ::, :::) where
dom(:::) contains only the equality relations.
A structure A is an L-structure iff:
1. Its restriction A |` Σ to the underlying algebraic signature is a (S,≤,Σ)-
algebra;
2. For each relation symbol R, with R ::: s1 × . . .× sk, A supplies a relation
RA ⊆ s1(A)× . . .× sk(A) .
We always interpret =sA as the standard equality on s(A). As before, the struc-
ture is in fact the map from the signature of L into its results.
A variable assignment (aka environment) η is a map η : Var(L) → A such
that for each variable v : s, η(v) ∈ s(A). That is, η is sort-respecting. If φ ⊆
form(L) is a formula of L and η is a variable assignment, then A |=η φ is
defined to mean that φ is satisfied in A under η in the usual style following
Tarski. Specifically:
Terms: Extend η from variables to term(L) using A by stipulating inductively
that ηA(f(t1, . . . , tk)) will be equal to fA(ηA(t1), . . . , ηA(tk)).
Atomic formulas: Stipulate A |=η R(t1, . . . , tk) iff ηA(t1), . . . , ηA(tk) ∈ RA;
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Compound formulas: Stipulate inductively that:
A |=η φ ∨ ψ iff A |=η φ or else A |=η ψ;
A |=η φ ∧ ψ iff A |=η φ and also A |=η ψ;
A |=η φ =⇒ ψ iff A 6|=η φ or else A |=η ψ; and
A |=η ¬φ iff A 6|=η φ.
If η is a variable assignment, v : s is a variable, and a ∈ s(A) is a member
of the domain for sort s, then η[v 7→ a] will mean the variable assignment
that returns a for v and agrees with η for all other variables. Using this
notation:
A |=η ∃v : s . φ iff, for some a ∈ s(A), A |=η[v 7→a] φ;
A |=η ∀v : s . φ iff, for every a ∈ s(A), A |=η[v 7→a] φ.
A |= φ means that A |=η φ for all η.
T is a theory of L iff T ⊆ sent(L) is a set of sentences of L. An L-structure
A is a model of T , written A |= T , iff A |= φ for every φ ∈ T .
Suppose that Σ0 = (S,≤, ::) and Σ = (S,≤, ::, :::). If A and B are Σ-
structures, then a Σ-homomorphism H : A → B is a sort respecting map from
the domains of A to the domains of B such that
1. H restricts to an algebra homomorphism (H |`Σ0) : (A |`Σ0)→ (B |`Σ0);
2. For each relation symbol R ::: s1 × . . .× sk, and each k-tuple (v1, . . . vk) ∈
s1(A)× . . .× sk(A),
(v1, . . . vk) ∈ RA implies (H(v1), . . . H(vk)) ∈ RB.
Suppose that Φ ∈ form(L) uses only the logical connectives conjunction ∧ and
disjunction ∨ and the existential quantifier ∃, and has no occurrences of negation
¬ or implication =⇒ or the universal quantifier ∀. Then formula Φ is positive
existential (PE). If H : A → B is an L-homomorphism, then if Φ is PE,
A |=η Φ implies B |=H◦η Φ.
That is, satisfaction is preserved for positive existential formulas, when we ex-
tend the variable assignment η to B by composing with H. In particular, when
Φ ∈ sent(L) has no free occurrences of variables, then A |= Φ implies B |= Φ.
Suppose A is a Σ = (S,≤, ::, :::)-structure, and L′ is a Σ′ = (S′,≤′, ::′, :::′)-
language, where S′ ⊆ S, ≤′ is ≤ restricted to S′, and ::′ and :::′ are subfunctions
of :: and ::: respectively. Then the notion of satisfaction carries over, as if L′ is
a sublanguage of a larger Σ-language. The semantic clauses are all local to the
sorts and vocabulary that actually appear in the formula. In section 4 we will
consider restricted languages in relation to richer structures.
4 Strands, bundles, and protocols
We will now introduce the main notions of the strand space framework, which
underlies cpsa. A protocol is a set of roles, together with some auxiliary in-
formation, and each role has instances, which are the behaviors of individual
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regular principals on different occasions. Because they have instances, it is nat-
ural that protocols involve variables. Thus, we will build them from linguistic
items, namely terms term(L) in suitable L. On the other hand, bundles are our
execution models, and they involve specific values. In particular, in the DH con-
text, they may involve field elements, and they may depend on the properties of
these field elements—such as identities involving polynomials—to be successful
executions. Thus, we will build bundles from non-linguistic items, namely the
values in our message algebra Mc (Def. 3).
Strands represent local behaviors of participants, or basic adversary actions.
We use them to define the roles of protocols, and this usage requires terms
containing variables. Strands are also constituents of bundles, and that usage
requires concrete values and field elements. Hence, we will allow strands of
both kinds, and we will henceforth use the word message to cover either terms
in some term(L) and also members of a message algebra, specifically Mc. We
will sometimes refer to terms in term(L) as “formal” messages, and to values in
Mc as “concrete” messages.
4.1 General notions
We will now introduce strands, bundles (our notion of execution), and protocols.
Strands. A strand represents a single local session of a protocol for a single
regular participant, or else a single adversary action. Suppose that M is a set of
messages such as Mc or term(L), and +,− are two values we use to represent
the direction of messages, representing transmission and reception, respectively.
When m ∈ M, we write +m and −m for short for the pairs (+,m) and (−,m).
We write ±M for the set of all such pairs, and (±M)+ for the set of non-empty
finite sequences of pairs.
By a strand space (Str , tr) over M we mean a set of objects Str equipped
with a trace function tr : Str → (±M)+. For each s ∈ Str , tr(s) is a finite
sequence of transmission and reception events. Other types of events have also
been used, for instance to model interaction with long term state [17, 19], but
only transmission and reception events will be needed here. We often do not
distinguish carefully between a strand s and its trace tr(s).
The length |s| of a strand s means the number of entries in tr(s). We will
use the same notation |α| for the length of a sequence α and for the cardinality
|S| of a set S. When 1 ≤ i ≤ |s|, we regard the pair (s, i) as representing the ith
event of tr(s); we call (s, i) a node and generally write it s ↓ i. If n is a node,
we write msg(n) for the message it sends or receives. The direction dir(n) of
a node is either + for transmission or − for reception. Thus, when n = s ↓ i,
tr(s)[i] = (dir(n),msg(n)).
We write n1 ⇒ n2 when the node n2 immediately follows n1 on the same
strand, i.e. n1 ⇒ n2 holds iff, for some strand s and integer i, n1 = s ↓ i and
n2 = s ↓ i+ 1. We write n1 ⇒+ n2 for the transitive closure: it holds iff,
for some strand s and integers i, j, i < j, n1 = s ↓ i and n2 = s ↓ j. The
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reflexive-transitive closure n1 ⇒∗ n2 is defined by the same condition but with
i ≤ j.
Bundles. Fix a strand space (Str , tr) over Mc. A binary relation → on nodes
is a communication relation iff n1 → n2 implies that n1 is a transmission node,
n2 is a reception node, msg(n1),msg(n2) ∈ Mc, and msg(n1) = msg(n2).
We require that the range of msg(·) be in Mc so that this last equality has
a definite meaning. If the messages here were terms, then the equality would
depend on what structure is chosen to interpret the terms. We will use the
bundle notion only when this structure is already selected; in this paper, our
selection is Mc.
Definition 4 Let B = (N ,→) be a set of nodes together with a communication
relation on N . B is a bundle (over Mc) iff:
1. n2 ∈ N and n1 ⇒ n2 implies n1 ∈ N ;
2. n2 ∈ N and n2 is a reception node implies there exists a unique n1 ∈ N
such that n1 → n2; and
3. Letting ⇒B be the restriction of ⇒ to N × N , the reflexive-transitive
closure (⇒B ∪ →)∗ is a well-founded relation. We write B for this
relation.
We write nodes(B) for N . We say a strand s is in B iff there exists an i
s.t. s ↓ i ∈ nodes(B) (hence, in particular, its first node s ↓ 1 ∈ nodes(B), by
clause 1).
If the set of nodes nodes(B) is finite, then the well-foundedness condition is
equivalent to saying that the finite directed graph (N ,→ ∪ ⇒B) is acyclic.
Protocol analysis uses the following bundle induction principle incessantly:
Lemma 1 (see [40]) If B is a bundle, and S ⊆ nodes(B) is non-empty, then
S contains B-minimal nodes.
For instance, if S is the set of nodes at which something bad is happening, this
principle justifies considering how it could first start to go wrong, and examining
the possible cases for that.
Bundles furnish our model of execution. Given a protocol Π, an execution of
Π with an active adversary is a bundle in which every strand represents either
an initial part of a local run of some role in Π, or else some adversary activity.
Protocols. A protocol consists of a set of strands over term(L), together
with some auxiliary information that provides assumptions, usually about fresh
choices and uncompromised keys.
Let Σ0 be a subsignature of Σc including mesg, and let Σ = (S,≤, ::, :::)
augment Σ0 with one new incomparable sort node. We will let :: be identical
with the arity function of Σ0, and require that the new relation symbols of :::
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all involve node. Thus, letting L be a language over Σ, we can interpret L over
structures whose mesgs belong to the structure Mc.
We will define an L-protocol Π. A protocol consists of a finite set of strands
over term(L) (the roles of Π) together with a function assume from nodes to
formulas in form(L). For simplicity, we also refer to the set of roles of Π by the
symbol Π. Thus, we say a protocol Π consists of:
1. A finite strand space (Str , tr) over the terms term(L). We call this finite
set of strands the roles of Π. We often write ρ ∈ Π to mean that ρ ∈ Str ,
thereby reducing notation. We write nodes(Π) to mean {ρ ↓ i : ρ ∈ Π
and 1 ≤ i ≤ |ρ|}; the image of this set under msg(·) consists of terms:
msg(nodes(Π)) ⊆ term(L).
The parameters of n ∈ nodes(Π) and ρ ∈ Π are the sets:
params(n) = {v ∈ Var(L) : ∃n0 . n0 ⇒∗ n and v ∈ fv(msg(n0))}.
params(ρ) = {v ∈ Var(L) : ∃i . v ∈ params(ρ ↓ i)}.
2. A function assume : nodes(Π) → form(L) such that, for a distinguished
variable vn : node, for all n ∈ nodes(Π), the free variables fv(assume(n)) ⊆
{vn} ∪ params(n).
Suppose that ρ ∈ Π and n1 = s ↓ j ∈ nodes(B), where B is a bundle over
Mc, and η is a variable assignment η : Var(L) → nodes(B) ∪Mc. Then n1 is an
instance of n2 = ρ ↓ i under η iff i = j and, inductively:
1. η(msg(n2)) = msg(n1);
2. η(vn) = n1 and B |=η assume(n2); and
3. if i = k + 1 where k ≥ 1, then n0 = s ↓ k is an instance of ρ ↓ k under
η[vn 7→ n0].
That is, η should send the terms of all nodes on the role up to n2 to the
corresponding messages in Mc, and all the assumptions should be satisfied. We
will define the adversary strands momentarily; relative to that notion, we can
define when a bundle is a possible run of a particular protocol.
Definition 5 Suppose that B is a bundle (over Mc) and Π is a protocol. B is
a bundle of protocol Π iff, for every strand s in B, either
1. s is an adversary strand, or else
2. letting n1 = s ↓ i be the last node of s in nodes(B), there is a role ρ ∈ Π
and a variable assignment ηs s.t. n1 is an instance of ρ ↓ i under ηs.
By altering ηs at vn, we also obtain assignments η[vn 7→ (s ↓ j)] that witness
for earlier nodes along s being instances of corresponding nodes ρ ↓ j.
There may be several different ρj of which a given n2 is an instance. This
may happen when the different ρj represent branching behaviors that diverge
only after the events present in B.
We will make the languages L more specific in Section 5.
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Creation: +g +1 +a for a : create
Multiplicative ops: −w1 ⇒ −w2 ⇒ +w1 · w2 −w1 ⇒ −w2 ⇒ +w1/w2
−h⇒ −w ⇒ +exp(h,w)
Additive ops: −w1 ⇒ −w2 ⇒ +(w1 +Fw2) −w1 ⇒ −w2 ⇒ +(w1−Fw2)
−exp(h,w1)⇒ −exp(h,w2)⇒ +exp(h,w1 +F w2)
Construction: −m1 ⇒ −m2 ⇒ +(m1,m2) −m⇒ −K ⇒ +{|m|}K
Destruction: −(m1,m2)⇒ +m1 −(m1,m2)⇒ +m2
−{|m|}K ⇒ −K−1 ⇒ +m
Symbols +,− mean transmission and reception.
Symbols +F ,−F mean field addition and subtraction.
Figure 9: Adversary strands for Mc.
4.2 The adversary
The adversary’s computational abilities include the remaining algebraic opera-
tions, as well as the derivation rules summarized in Fig. 8. The adversary can
also select values. We represent these abilities as strands. A computation in
which the adversary generates f(a, b) as a function of potentially known values
a and b may be expressed as a strand −a ⇒ −b ⇒ +f(a, b). If the inputs a
and b are in fact known, then the adversary can deliver them as messages to be
received by this strand. The strand will then transmit the value f(a, b). That
in turn can either be delivered to a regular strand, or else delivered to further
adversary strands to compute more complicated results. In this way, we build
up acyclic graph structures that “mimic” any composite derivations that may
be generated by rules such as those in Fig. 8.
The adversary can also select values of his own choosing. We will assume that
this means he can originate values of the sorts skey,name,text,akey,trsc
and Q. In particular, if the adversary wants, the adversary can choose a random
exponent, which we represent by a choice in trsc. The adversary can certainly
choose the field value 1, and by using addition and division, then adversary can
obtain any rational in Q. In all, this gives the adversary the abilities represented
in the strands shown in Fig. 9.
The first three groups concern basic values. The first group presents the cre-
ation strands, which allow the adversary to generate its own values. The second
and third groups contains the algebraic operations, in which the arguments to
the operation are received and the result is transmitted. The second group con-
tains the operations that use the multiplicative structure of the field, while the
third group contains those that use the additive structure. We separate them
because we will omit them from the powers of the adversary when we restrict
our protocols to those in which the regular participants use only multiplicative
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structure (following [24]).
The fourth group provides adversary strands that model the constructive
↑-rules of Fig. 8. The fifth group provides adversary strands to cover the de-
structive ↓-rules of Fig. 8. We writeK−1 for inv(K) whenK : akey; we stipulate
that K−1 = K for any key not of that sort.
By “routing” the results of some adversary strands as inputs to others, the
adversary can build up finite acyclic graph structures that do all the work of the
inductively defined derivation relation generated from Fig. 8 and correspond-
ing algebraic rules. Moreover, the adversary strands have an advantage: They
provide well-localized, earliest places where certain kinds of values become avail-
able, as we will illustrate in Section 6.1. Hence, defining bundles to include these
adversary strands provides a convenience for reasoning.
We formalize the idea of routing results among adversary strands as adver-
sary webs:
Definition 6 Suppose that (W,→) consists of a finite strand space in which
every strand is an adversary strand, together with a communication relation →
on the nodes of W .
(W,→) is an adversary web iff it is acyclic. We write W for the well-
founded partial order (⇒W ∪ →)∗. A node n ∈ nodes(W ) is a root iff it is
W -maximal. It is a leaf iff it is a W -minimal reception node.
We regard an adversary web as a method for deriving its roots, assuming that
its leaves are somehow obtained with the help of regular protocol participants.
A web may not have any leaves, as happens when all of its W -minimal nodes
are creation nodes, and thus transmissions. Every bundle contains a family of
adversary webs, which show how the adversary has obtained the messages re-
ceived by the regular participants, with the help of earlier regular transmissions.
By expanding definitions, we obtain the conclusions summarized in this lemma:
Lemma 2 Let B be a Π-bundle, and let n ∈ nodes(B) be a regular reception
node. Define W to contain an adversary strand s iff there is a path in B from
the last node s ↓ |s| to n that traverses only adversary nodes. Define → to be
→B ∩(W ×W ). Then:
1. (W,→) is an adversary web.
2. If W is non-empty, then W has a root n1 such that msg(n1) = msg(n).
3. For every leaf n1 of (W,→), then there exists a regular transmission node
n0 ∈ nodes(B) such that n0 B n and msg(n1) = msg(n0).
We call (W,→) the adversary web rooted at n in B.
4.3 Properties of protocols
Paths and positions. We often want to look inside values built by the free
constructors, identifying the parts by their position. This is well-defined because
we use these positions only within constructors that are free.
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A position pi is a finite sequence pi ∈ N∗ of natural numbers. The concate-
nation of positions pi and pi′ is written pi a pi′. A path is a pair p = (m,pi). The
(1-based) submessage of m at pi, written m@ pi, is defined recursively:
m@ 〈〉 = m;
τ(m1, . . . ,mi) @ 〈j〉 a pi = mj @ pi when 1 ≤ j ≤ i;
{|m|}k @ 〈1〉 a pi = m@ pi;
{|m|}k @ 〈2〉 a pi = k @ pi;
otherwise: m@ pi = ⊥
When p = (m,pi) is a path, we write @p for m @ pi. We often focus only on
carried paths which do not descend into keys of encryptions.
Definition 7 Suppose pi is a position and m is a message.
Path p = (m,pi) terminates at its endpoint @p.
If pi = pi1
a pi2, then p visits m@pi1. If moreover pi2 6= 〈〉, p traverses m@pi1.
If c ∈ Mc, then we say that c is a unit iff c is not a tuple. Equivalently, c is
a unit iff it is either basic, c ∈ Mb, or else a cryptographic value c = {|m|}K .
Paths traverse only free constructors of Σc, and never traverse messages belong-
ing to the underlying given algebra Mb.
Importantly, this helps justify adding a proper treatment of DH’s alge-
braic behavior without disrupting cpsa’s existing approach to cryptography
and freshness. Equational theories on Mb (e.g. a commutative law) can never
disrupt the unambiguous notion of the submessage at a position pi, whenever it
applies. This also justifies using the path notion for terms in term(L) as well as
members of Mc. The latter mimic the structure of the former unambiguously
throughout the free operators.
Definition 8 1. A path p = (m,pi) is a carried path iff p never visits the
key of an encryption, but only its plaintext. That is, if pi = pi1
a pi2 and
m@ pi1 = {|t|}K , and if pi2 6= 〈〉, then pi2 = 〈1, . . .〉 and not pi2 = 〈2, . . .〉.
Message m0 is carried in m1, written m0 v m1 iff m0 = m1 @ pi for some
carried path (m1, pi).
2. A message m originates at node n = s ↓ i iff m v msg(n), and n is a
transmission dir(n) = +, and 1 ≤ j < i implies m 6v msg(s ↓ j).
3. If S is a set of nodes, then m originates uniquely in S iff m originates on
exactly one n ∈ S. It is non-originating in S iff it originates on no n ∈ S.
4. Message t is visible in m iff t = m @ pi for some carried path p = (m,pi)
such that p never traverses an encryption, but only tuples.
We will use the following lemma later, in proving Lemma 4; it says a field value
originating on an adversary node is the whole message of that node.
Lemma 3 Suppose that B is a bundle, and p : fld originates at an adversary
node n ∈ nodes(B). Then p = msg(n).
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Proof: The adversary node n does not lie on an encryption, decryption, tupling,
or separation strand, none of which originate any basic value. Thus, n lies on a
creation or algebraic strand, and msg(n) : basic. Since no nontrivial path exists
within a basic value, no value other than msg(n) is carried within msg(n). uunionsq
The “acquired constraint” on protocols. Since the roles of a protocol
definition form a strand space over term(L), their messages contain variables.
Some of these variables X : mesg can be instantiated by any message, meaning
that their instances do not have a predictable “shape.”
Two things may go wrong if these variables occur first in a transmission
node. First, syntactic constraints on the roles of a protocol will not enforce
invariants on the instances of the roles. Instances may map a variable of sort
message to any m ∈ Mc, so that the transmitted message may have any value as
a submessage. Thus, even values that could never be computed as a consequence
of the workings of the protocol can originate as arbitrary instances of X : mesg.
If variables of sort message may occur first in transmission nodes, then we
could not guarantee a finitely branching cpsa search. If X : mesg first appears
in a transmission node on ρ ∈ Π, then its instances will include messages of all
formats. Not all of them are instances of any finite set of more specific forms, if
those forms do not use further variables Y : mesg of sort message. This blows
up the search. If, instead, X comes from a reception node, it may still take
infinitely many formats, but the relevant differences arise in a finitely branching
search, guided by the forms of earlier transmissions.
A variable X : mesg is acquired on node n1 = ρ ↓ i iff X is carried in
msg(n1), dir(n1) = −, and for all n0 ⇒+ n1, X /∈ fv(msg(n1)).
Π satisfies the acquired constraint iff, for any n1 ∈ nodes(Π) and any variable
X : mesg, if X ∈ fv(msg(n2)), then there is a reception node n1 such that
n1 ⇒∗ n2 and X is acquired on n1.
Protocols that separate transcendental variables. We will rely in our
analysis on a property that many protocols, though not all, satisfy. We will
exclude the remaining protocols from our tool. The property concerns how the
protocol handles field values that are not used for exponentiation but transmit-
ted in carried position. These field values contribute to messages as entries in
tuples and in the plaintexts of cryptographic operations. We do not constrain
how field values feed into exponents at all.
A protocol Π that satisfies the acquired constraint separates transcendental
variables iff, whenever ρ ∈ Π, n = ρ ↓ i is a transmission node on ρ, and
p = (msg(n), pi) is a carried path in the term msg(n), if t = msg(n) @ pi is of sort
field t : fld, then t is a variable of the sort transcendental, t ∈ Var and t : trsc.
Thus, Π never sends out—in carried position—a term that has the form of
a product xy or 3x. By contrast, we can use them for exponentiation and send
out gxy or g3x without any problem.
This restriction is mild for us. We use field values in carried position mainly
to model the compromise of regular choices that were previously secret, for
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instance to represent forward secrecy. We represent these choices as transcen-
dentals, and therefore the compromise event transmits one newly compromised
values or, if several, as a tuple but not algebraically combined.
This rules out some protocols. For instance, the Schnorr signature protocol
transmits a term k− xe where k : trsc is an ephemeral random value; x : trsc
is the signer’s long-term secret; and e is a term representing the hash of the
message to be signed and gk. This is an anthology of things we do not represent.
It involves the additive structure of the field, which we will subsequently assume
the protocol definition ignores. It transmits a field value that is not simply one
of the transcendentals x, k. And, moreover, it uses hashing to generate a field
value. Our hash function #(m) generates values of sort mesg, and our algebra
offers no way to coerce them to the field F . This last is the simplest to remedy,
and a version of cpsa in the near future will support hashing into the exponent.
We can however perfectly well view Schnorr signatures as a cryptographic
primitive {|m|}K , where K involves the signer’s long-term secret. We just do not
represent how it works. Computational cryptography backs up the assumption
that it in fact acts as a signature.
A concrete message is present in another one if it is at the end of any path,
whether carried or not, or if it is a transcendental with non-zero degree in
something at the end of a path:
Definition 9 A concrete message m0 ∈ Mc is present in m1 iff there is a path
p = (m1, pi) such that either m0 = m1 @ pi, or else m0 ∈ trsc and, letting
c = m1 @ pi, either
1. c ∈ F and m0 has non-zero degree in c; or
2. c = gp ∈ C, and m0 has non-zero degree in p.
A message m ∈ Mc is chosen at node n = s ↓ i iff m v msg(n), and n is a
transmission dir(n) = +, and 1 ≤ j < i implies m is not present in msg(s ↓ j).
We do not make any corresponding definition for formal messages t ∈ term(LΠ),
because an occurrence of a variable v : trsc in a term t : fld is not preserved
under interpretation or under substitution. For instance, when t is v · w, for a
variable w : fld, then ηB(t) = 1 when η(w) = 1/η(v). Similarly, v cancels out
under the substitution w 7→ w1/v. Chosen is to “present” as originates is to
“carried.”
Recall (Def. 8) that a message t is visible in a message m iff we can reach t
within m by traversing only tuples.
Lemma 4 Suppose Π separates transcendentals, B is a Π-bundle, and x ∈ trsc
is present in p ∈ F . If p is visible in msg(np) for np ∈ nodes(B), then x is
visible in msg(nx) for some nx B np.
Proof: Choose B, and if there are any x, p, np that furnish a counterexample
let np ∈ nodes(B) be B-minimal among counterexamples for any x, p. Observe
first that x 6= p, since if x = p this is not a counterexample to the property.
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Since p is carried in msg(np), there exists an no B np such that p originates
on no. By the definition of originates, no is a transmission node.
First, we show that no does not lie on an adversary strand, by taking cases on
the adversary strands. The creation strands that emit values in fld originate
1, members of Q, and transcendentals y : trsc. But x is not present in 1 or
values in Q, and if x is present in y, then x and y are identical, which we have
excluded.
If no lies on a algebraic strand, then it takes incoming field values p1, p2.
Since x has non-zero degree in p only if it has non-zero degree in at least one of
the pi, this contradicts the B-minimality of the counterexample.
Node no does not lie on an encryption, decryption, tupling, or separa-
tion strand, which never originate values in basic.
Thus, no does not lie on an adversary strand.
Finally, no does not lie on a regular strand of Π. By the DH-simple assump-
tion, if no originates the field value p, then p is a transcendental. Thus, if x is
present, p = x, which was excluded above. uunionsq
Subsignature of Σc. cpsa uses unification systematically, and unification
in the theory of fields and related theories is undecidable. In this work, our
approach is to omit the additive structure 0,+,−. This restricts the class of
protocols to the fairly large set in which the regular participants do not use it,
but remains faithful: The adversary does not need to use the additive struc-
ture either, to achieve all possible attacks against these protocols [24]. But see
also [11, 12] for alternatives that avoid unification.
For the remainder of this paper, we will focus on the “multiplicative-only”
signature Σm = Σc \ {0,+,−} for messages.
We continue to use the message algebra Mc, containing the field Q(trsc),
but we will consider only protocols that do not mention its addition operations,
nor the group operation, which amounts to adding exponents. By [24], we
may assume that the adversary never uses the strands for field addition and
subtraction, and for the group operation (addition in the exponent).
Thus, we will interpret these protocols in structures whose domains for mes-
sage sorts are those of Mc, but whose signature has “forgotten” the additive
structure. Thus, from now on, all of the polynomials we consider will in fact be
monomials. We will write µ, ν, etc. for monomials in Q(trsc), namely polynomi-
als with a rational coefficient but no additions in a number of transcendentals
x1, . . . xi ∈ trsc. The transcendentals may occur with positive or negative de-
gree.
By a result of Liskov and Thayer [24], when the protocol uses only the
multiplicative structure, the adversary does not need the additive strands. That
is, every attack that can be achieved using all of the adversary strands of Fig. 9
can be achieved without the additive strands. Therefore, we do not weaken the
adversary if:
Assumption 1 We henceforth assume that no bundle B contains any occur-
rences of the additive adversary strands.
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Protocols that separate exponents: Group elements. Lemma 4 tells us
what must hold if a polynomial p is disclosed, assuming the protocol separates
transcendentals. Namely, any transcendental x : trsc with non-0 degree in p is
also disclosed. We now provide a related property for the group elements. It
holds for protocols that separate transcendentals and use only the multiplicative
signature Σm. Thus, the only polynomials of interest are monomials µ.
The lemma says that when a group element gµ ∈ C is disclosed, then either
all of the transcendentals x : trsc with non-0 degree in monomial µ are also
disclosed, or else we can divide the monomial µ into two parts ν and µ/ν. All
the transcendentals in ν are disclosed. And some regular participant tansmitted
gµ/ν in carried position. Thus, responsibility for ν lies with the adversary, and
responsibility for sending an exponentiated version of the quotient lies with some
instance of a role of the protocol.
Lemma 5 Suppose Π is a protocol over Σm that separates transcendentals and
uses only multiplicative structure; B is a Π-bundle; and gµ ∈ C is carried in
msg(nµ) where node nµ ∈ nodes(B). Then there is a monomial ν ∈ F s.t.:
1. ν is a product of transcendentals visible before nµ, and
2. either (i) ν = µ or else
(ii) letting ξ = µ/ν, there is a regular transmission node nξ ∈ nodes(B)
such that nξ B nµ and the value gξ is carried in msg(nξ). Moreover gξ
was previously visible.
Proof: Let B be a bundle, let nµ ∈ nodes(B), and assume inductively that the
claim holds for all nodes n ≺ nµ. If nµ is a reception node, then the (earlier)
paired transmission node satisfies the property by the IH. However, the same ν
and nξ also satisfy the property for nµ. If nµ is a regular transmission, then the
conclusion holds with ν = 1, the empty product of transcendentals.
So suppose nµ lies on an adversary strand. If nµ transmits the group element
g, then let ν = µ = 1. The constructive strands for tupling or encryption
provide no new group elements in carried position. Nor do the destructive
strands for untupling or decryption.
Thus, the remaining possibility is that nµ is the transmission on an expo-
nentiation strand −h⇒ −w ⇒ +exp(h,w) where exp(h,w) = gµ. By the IH,
for the node receiving h ∈ C, the property is met. Thus, h = gµ0 , where there
exist ν0, ξ0 satisfying the conditions.
Hence, we may take ν = ν0w and ξ = ξ0. By Lemma 4, w is a product of
previously visible transcendentals, so the requirements are met. uunionsq
It also follows that if gµ is visible at nµ, then g
ξ is visible before nµ. We will
wrap up our three protocol requirements in the word “compliant.”
Definition 10 A protocol Π is compliant if Π separates transcendentals, uses
only multiplicative structure, and satisfies the acquired constraint.
33
5 Protocol languages, skeletons and cohorts
In this section, we will introduce a language LΠ for each protocol Π. The
skeletons for Π are certain theories A in that language. We regard a skeleton as
describing certain executions; in our formalization the executions are bundles,
and we will use the usual semantic relation of satisfaction to define which bundles
B a skeleton A describes. Specifically, let I be an interpretation from LΠ into
B; A describes B under this interpretation if I |= A.
Some skeletons “fully describe” some bundle B under an interpretation I,
which we define below to mean that I is an injective map and is also surjective
for nodes (Def. 14).
5.1 The protocol languages
The logical langauge LΠ for the protocol Π can be used to express its protocol
goals, but extends the goal language of Guttman, Rowe, et al. [18, 37], as it also
describes the behavior in individual executions in more detail. It uses a first
order signature Σ∗ that extends Σc (still omitting the additive operators) with:
Sort node for strand nodes;
Individual constants C, disjoint from Σc, in infinite supply at every sort;
Protocol-independent vocabulary, which is the same for all protocols Π; and
Protocol-dependent vocabulary, which gives a way to refer to the specific
kinds of nodes on the roles of Π, and the values their parameters take.
We provide more detail about the last two categories below.
If Σ∗ is any structure that extends Σc, we will define a Mc-interpretation
I to be a Σ∗-structure whose restriction to Σc agrees with the map Mc. Since
Σ∗ may involve entirely new sorts (such as node), the target of I may involve
entirely new domains.
Protocol-independent vocabulary L includes equality at all sorts and:
msg :: node→ mesg
Prec ::: node× node Coll ::: node× node DerBy ::: node× mesg
Absent ::: trsc× fld GenAt ::: node× node× basic Non ::: node× mesg
We will use typewriter font for function and relation symbols in LΠ.
The function symbol msg returns the message transmitted or received on a
node. The relation symbols Prec, Coll are satisfied by a pair of nodes (resp.) iff
the first precedes the second and iff both lie on the same strand. We sometimes
write StrPrec(v0, v1) to mean Prec(v0, v1) ∧ Coll(v0, v1).
DerBy says that its message argument is derivable from messages visible on
nodes preceding its node argument. Absent(v, w) says that the transcendental
v has degree zero in the field element w. Non(v) says that v originates nowhere,
and GenAt(n0, n1, v) says that v is chosen only on nodes n0, n1 (Def. 8).
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Term Semantics
ηI(msg(t)) msg(ηI(t))
Formula Semantics
I |=η Prec(t1, t2) iff ηI(t1) ≺B ηI(t2)
I |=η Coll(t1, t2) iff there exist s, i, j such that ηI(t1) = s ↓ i,
ηI(t2) = s ↓ j, and (s ↓ i), (s ↓ j) ∈ nodes(B)
I |=η Absent(t1, t2) iff ηI(t1) is not present in ηI(t2)
I |=η Non(t1) iff ηI(t1) does not originate at any n ∈ nodes(B)
I |=η GenAt(t1, t2, t3) iff for all n ∈ nodes(B), if ηI(t3) is chosen at n,
then n = ηI(t1) or n = ηI(t2)
I |=η DerBy(t1, t2) iff there is an adversary web with root ηI(t2)
in which, for every leaf `,
either ` ∈ nodes(B) and ` B ηI(t1), or else
dir(`) = − and there is an n ∈ nodes(B) s.t.
dir(n) = +, msg(`) = msg(n), and n B ηI(t1)
I |=η RPρ,i(t1) iff ηI(t1) is an instance of ρ ↓ i under some θ
I |=η Pρ,v(t1, t2) iff, for some ρ ∈ Π, i s.t. v ∈ params(ρ ↓ i),
for some assignment θ : Var(LΠ)→ B,
ηI(t1) is an instance of ρ ↓ i under θ,
and θ(v) = ηI(t2)
Figure 10: Semantics of protocol independent and dependent vocabulary
We write UnqGen(n, v) to mean GenAt(n, n, v), where v can only be chosen at
n. cpsa currently implements UnqGen(n, v) rather than the full GenAt(n0, n1, v).
The latter would be convenient for expressing compromise assumptions (e.g. in
forward secrecy assertions) in a compact, uniform way.
Definition 11 Let B be any bundle, and let I be any Mc-interpretation for L
such that node(I) ⊆ nodes(B), i.e. the sort node is interpreted by nodes in B.
The clauses in the upper block of Fig. 10 give the semantics of the protocol
independent vocabulary of L. We write syntactic text within LΠ in blue to
distinguish it from our informal metatheory for properties of bundles.
By an adversary web in the clause for DerBy(t1, t2), we mean a directed
acyclic graph built from adversary strands (Def. 6). Its leaves are any earliest
reception nodes, which are required to draw values from the bundle B. Its roots
are all latest nodes; the messages on these nodes are the values derived.
Protocol-dependent vocabulary of LΠ consists of role position predicates
and parameter predicates. A role position predicate is a one-place predicate of
nodes. There is one role position predicate for each pair ρ, i such that ρ ∈ Π
and 1 ≤ i ≤ |ρ|, and it is true of a node n iff that node is an instance of ρ ↓ i.
Any family of distinct predicate symbols may be chosen for the role position
predicates. We will refer to them as RPρ,i; i.e. RP·,· is a two dimensional table
35
with rows labeled by roles of Π and columns indexed by the positions along
them. The entries in the RP·,· table are the role position predicates.
A parameter predicate is a two-place predicate relating a node to a message
value. There is one role position predicate for each pair ρ, v such that ρ ∈ Π
and v ∈ params(ρ). It is true of a node n and a message value t iff, for some
i, η, v ∈ fv(msg(ρ ↓ i)) and n is an instance of ρ ↓ i under η where η(v) = t.
Thus, n is not related to any message value t if it is an instance of ρ ↓ i, but v
is a parameter that first occurs in ρ ↓ j for j > i. There is, however, at most
one possible v; i.e. the parameter value is a partial function of the node.
The predicate symbols for parameter predicates need not be entirely distinct.
For instance, both an initiator role and a responder role may have Peer and Self
parameter predicates. Choices like this are desirable when the parameters have
corresponding significance for different roles. If ni and nr lie on instances of
the initiator and responder roles, and are high enough that the parameters are
defined, then these are matching sessions only if Self(ni, A) ≡ Peer(nr, A)
and Peer(ni, B) ≡ Self(nr, B), etc. Reusing parameter predicates in different
roles is safe when the roles have no instances in common, for instance when one
begins with a transmission and the other begins with a reception.
We will refer to the parameter predicates as Pρ,v; i.e. P·,· is a two dimensional
table with rows labeled by roles of Π and columns indexed by their parameters.
The entries in the P·,· table are the parameter predicates.
The (straightforward) semantics for the protocol-dependent vocabulary of
LΠ is given in the lower block of Fig. 10. In this case, we are only interested in
the case in which B is in fact a Π-bundle.
Some relevant axioms. There are a number of axioms expressed in terms of
these predicates that are satisfied in all Π-bundles. We gather them in Fig. 11.
We will refer to these axioms as the skeleton axioms Axsk.
A theory T is a set of sentences T ⊆ sent(LΠ). We write T  φ when φ is a
logical consequence of the sentences in T , avoiding the standard symbol ` which
is also used for adversary derivability as in Fig. 8. Let α[~t/~v] be the result of
replacing the variables in ~v by the corresponding terms ~t throughout α.
Definition 12 A theory T ⊆ sent(LΠ) is in expanded form iff, for any tuple
of constants ~c and any axiom ∀~v . α =⇒ ∃~w . β in Axsk, where ~w may be empty:
If T  α[~c], then there are constants ~d such that T  β[~c/~v; ~d/~w].
Expanding a theory may make it larger, but not too much. We use | · | to express
the cardinality |S| of a set as well as the length |s| of a strand. If T is a set of
formulas, we write C(T ) for the set of constants occurring in T .
Lemma 6 Assume Π is a protocol whose roles are of length less than `: ρ ∈
Π implies |ρ| < `. Suppose that each role ρ ∈ Π has less than j parame-
ters: |params(ρ)| < j. And suppose that the assumptions of nodes of Π are
atomic formulas, and each node has less than k assumptions: ρ ∈ Π implies
|assume(ρ ↓ i)| < k.
36
Prec is transitive and anti-reflexive, i.e. a strict order.
Coll is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive, i.e. an equivalence relation.
Precedence for RP·,·: For each ρ ∈ Π and j where 1 ≤ j < |ρ|:
∀n : node . RPρ,j+1(n) =⇒ ∃m. RPρ,j(m) ∧ StrPrec(m,n).
Strand uniqueness of RP·,·: Only one node on a strand satisfies any role position
predicate. That is, for each ρ ∈ Π and j where 1 ≤ j < |ρ|:
∀m,n : node . RPρ,j(n) ∧ RPρ,j(m) ∧ Coll(m,n) =⇒ m = n.
Existence for P·,·: For each ρ ∈ Π, j, and v such that v ∈ params(ρ ↓ j),
∀n : node . RPρ,j(n) =⇒ ∃v1 . Pρ,v(n, v1).
Preservation for P·,·: For each ρ ∈ Π and each v ∈ params(ρ):
∀m,n : node, v1 : mesg . StrPrec(m,n) ∧ Pρ,v(m, v1) =⇒ Pρ,v(n, v1).
Uniqueness for P·,·: For each ρ ∈ Π and each v ∈ params(ρ):
∀n : node, v1, v2 : mesg . Pρ,v(n, v1) ∧ Pρ,v(n, v2) =⇒ v1 = v2.
Figure 11: Axsk axiom groups
If T is any theory in LΠ, let N(T ) ⊆ C(T ) be the set of constants of sort
node occurring in T .
Suppose that T ⊆ sent(LΠ) is a finite theory consisting of atomic sentences
that may contain constants in C.Then there exists a theory Te ⊇ T in expanded
form such that, letting b = `|N(T )|:
1. |N(Te)| ≤ b;
2. |Te| ≤ (2j + k)b+ 3b2 + |T |;
3. Te ∪ Axsk is conservative over T ∪ Axsk for sentences in C(T ).
I.e., suppose that φ ∈ sent(LΠ) and C(φ) ⊆ C(T ). Then if Te ∪ Axsk  φ,
then T ∪ Axsk  φ.
From this it follows that it is decidable whether an atomic sentence in the
constants C(T ) is a consequence of T ∪ Axsk.
Proof: Repeatedly instantiate the existential quantifiers of role predecessor
axioms with new node constants, whenever they are not yet met in the theory.
Because ` is a length bound on roles, we can add at most ` − 1 new node
constants for each node constant appearing in a role position sentence in T .
There are at most |T | node constants occurring in these sentences, since each
role position predicate is unary.
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For each one of these, we now obtain Te by saturating the theory by adding
the corresponding assumptions. Each one of them can contribute at most j
parameter predicate assertions, and at most k assumptions. For each node and
each parameter assertion about it, there may be an equation introduced by a
strand uniqueness axiom.
There are less than b2 order assertions, and no more than b2 of collinear-
ity. There can be no more than b2 equations introduced by strand uniqueness
axioms. There could be |T | other assertions inherited from T .
Te is conservative: Suppose any sentence φ ∈ Te is in the minimal such Te,
and contains the new constants ~c. Selecting new variables ~v, the existential
closure ∃~v . φ[~v/~c] is already a consequence of T ∪ Axsk. This holds invariantly,
as it is preserved when we introduce a new constant to witness for an exitential
conclusion, and also under deduction. If φ contains no new constants, then the
existential closure is vacuous, and ∃~v . φ[~v/~c] is identical to φ. uunionsq
5.2 Skeletons
For the remainder of this section, consider a fixed protocol Π. Thus, by a role,
we will mean a role ρ ∈ Π; by a bundle, we will mean a Π-bundle; by L, we will
mean the language LΠ of Π; etc.
In the order-sorted context, we define a role-specific theory (cp. [18, Def. 5.8])
as follows. A skeleton is a theory which is role-specific and in expanded form;
the latter means that it is closed under the skeleton axioms (Def. 12).
Definition 13 1. A set T ⊆ sent(LΠ) of (well-sorted) sentences is a role-
specific theory iff, for every individual constant c : node, if c ∈ C(T ), then
for some atomic formula RPρ,i(c) ∈ T , c is the argument of a role position
predicate RPρ,i(c).
2. A skeleton A is a role-specific theory A ⊆ sent(LΠ) in expanded form.
3. Let H be a sort-respecting map from constants c ∈ C to term(LΠ); extend
H from constants to terms and formulas homomorphically.
H is a skeleton homomorphism H : A→ B iff it is a theory interpretation
for Π-bundles, i.e. for all Π-bundles B and interpretations I into B, let
J be the interpretation that sends c to the value to which I sends H(c).
Then I |= B implies J |= H(A).
By a theory interpretation we mean the semantic notion, i.e. it may restrict
but does not add models. We use this rather than a notion defined in terms
of deduction because we have not fully axiomatized the set of Π-bundles here.
We will avoid doing so, because the notions of origination and chosen values
(Defs. 8, 9) require a somewhat cumbersome inductive definition.
Moreover, we follow the cpsa tradition of using skeletons as data structures
that we inspect and build in computations, rather than as explicit theories in
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which we do deduction. cpsa’s skeletons maintain some consequences of unique
and non-origination assumptions, which are not captured in Axsk. Apart from
this, however, they maintain the same information that is expressed in role-
specific theories in expanded form; essentially, this is the content of Thms. 4.13–
4.15 of [18]. Indeed, a role-specific theory in expanded form determines formal
messages sent and received, so that we can use matching and unification on
these terms in just the way that cpsa previously solved its problems [17, 25].
In particular, cpsa looks for reception nodes n in a skeleton A that receive
formal messages that the adversary cannot supply given previous transmissions
in A. Each such “non-derivable” node indicates that the skeleton A is incom-
plete, i.e. it may describe some bundles, but it is not a full description of any
bundle.
Definition 14 Let B be a Π-bundle, I : C → B, and A be a skeleton.
1. A I-covers B iff I is an interpretation into B and I |= A.
2. B I-realizes A iff A I-covers B and:
(a) for all terms t1, t2 ∈ term(LΠ), if I(t1) = I(t2) then A  t1 = t2;
(b) I is surjective on regular nodes; i.e., for every regular n ∈ nodes(B),
there is a constant c : node in C(A) such that I(c) = n.
3. A formula Ψ is Π-entailed by A iff, whenever A I-covers B, then I |= Ψ.
4. If A is a skeleton, then the nodes of A, written nodes(A), is the set of
constants c : node in C(A).
Node c0 precedes node c1 in A iff A  Prec(c0, c1).
A covers B iff, for some I, A I-covers B. B realizes A iff, for some I, A
I-realizes B. A is realized iff some B realizes it.
When B realizes A, A describes all of the regular events in B. Moreover, A is no
more generic then B, in the sense that it reflects all of the equations that B forces
to be true. Indeed, when B realizes A, there may be “more specific” bundles
B′ that force additional equations to be true. However, when A is realized, it
is already specific enough to explain what happens in some possible execution,
factoring out the details of how the adversary chooses to derive messages that
will be derivable.
Derivable nodes. The adversary, when acting on the formal messages of a
skeleton A, can use instances of the adversary strands of Fig. 9, regarded as
strands over formal terms. Moreover, the adversary can feed a term produced
by a transmission node to a reception node when the two nodes agree on the
term in question. In establishing this equality, we can use the axioms for the
field and group operations as well as the axioms of Def. 2.
Since the division axiom has the premise that the divisor is non-zero, we also
need a source of assertions of that form. Since every transcendental is different
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from zero, we always have the formula v 6= 0 for variables v : trsc. By the field
axioms, t1 6= 0 and t2 6= 0 iff t1 · t2 6= 0.
Since we are ignoring the additive structure, each t : fld is a quotient of
monomials. These are easy to simplify: One simply cancels common factors,
resulting in a monomial µ with a rational coefficient and a sequence of distinct
variables x : trsc each raised to a positive or negative power. We will say that
x : trsc occurs in t if it occurs in this reduced form µ.
Using these methods for proving equalities, we can build up formal adversary
webs (cp. Def. 6). These are directed acyclic graphs in which the nodes lie
on adversary strands, and in which the communication edge +t1 → −t2 is
permitted if there is a proof that t1 = t2.
In formal adversary webs, we allow creation nodes in which we create a
constant c : fld. These are unproblematic, because we can always interpret
them by sending c to an otherwise unused transcendental, or indeed to 1.
Likewise, adapting Def. 9, we can speak of a node with message in term(LΠ)
choosing a subterm. Let us say that a term t0 occurs in a term t1 if, having
simplified monomials in t0, t1 as just described, t0 occurs syntactically in t1. For
instance x : trsc occurs in xy/y and x2y/x but not in xy/x.
Now we will say that a term t0 is chosen at node n = s ↓ i iff t0 occurs in
msg(n), and n is a transmission dir(n) = +, and 1 ≤ j < i implies t0 does not
occur in msg(s ↓ j).
For a skeleton A, an earliest creation node +c is permitted if c is unrestricted
in A. A constant c is restricted if Non(c) ∈ A—so that c must be non-originating
in any bundle to be covered—or if GenAt(t1, t2, c) ∈ A—so that c can be chosen
only on the regular nodes interpreting t1, t2. If there is no such formula in A,
then c can be freely created by the adversary.
Definition 15 Let A be a skeleton. A message t ∈ term(LΠ) is derivable by
node n1 ∈ nodes(A) iff there is a formal adversary web with root t such that
(i) every creation node has unrestricted value, and (ii) every leaf receives its
message from a transmission node n0 ∈ nodes(A) where n0 precedes n1 in A.
A is derivable iff:
1. for every reception n1 ∈ nodes(A) in A, msg(n) is derivable by n in A;
2. if A  DerBy(n, t), then t is derivable by n in A;
3. if A  Absent(x, t), then x does not occur in t;
4. if A  GenAt(n1, n2, t), then t is chosen on n iff n = n1 or n = n2;
5. if A  Non(t), then t originates on no node n ∈ nodes(A).
We say that n is derivable in A iff msg(n) and all terms t such that A 
DerBy(n, t) with this n are derivable by n in A.
Thus, a skeleton is derivable iff all of its nodes are derivable, and the Absent,
GenAt, and Non constraints are met.
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Lemma 7 If A is derivable, then there is a bundle B such that B realizes A.
Proof: Choose distinct values of corresponding sort in Mc for all message con-
stants in C(A), using transcendentals for constants of sort fld as well as of sort
trsc. Choose distinct nodes for each node constant cn, with their directions
and messages determined by the role definitions determined by their node po-
sition predicates and parameter predicates. These nodes are the regular nodes
of B. These choices determine an interpretation map I.
By clause 1, there is a formal web rooted at each cn that derives it formally
from earlier transmissions. Applying I turns this into an advesary web over Mc.
Thus, the nodes form a bundle when equipped with these adversary webs. The
remaining annotations are satisfied by the corresponding clauses of Def. 15. uunionsq
Curiously, the converse of this lemma is false.
Consider a skeleton A containing one regular strand, consisting of a node that
sends +{|gx|}K , after which−gxw is received. Here, x : trsc is assumed uniquely
generated, and the symmetric key is non-originating. Since the variable w : fld
is of the broader field sort, we may apply a substitution σ that sends w 7→ z/x,
meaning that, in σ(A) the adversary must supply the value gx(z/x) = gz. Since
z is unconstrained, this the adversary can easily supply, with a creation followed
by an exponentiation.
The substitution τ in which z 7→ wx inverts σ, i.e. τ(σ(A)) is the same
theory as A. Thus, the two skeletons A and σ(A) are inter-interpretable. Since
σ(A) is derivable—hence also realized—A is also realized.
cpsa rewrites skeletons when possible to make receptions derivable, after
which we use derivability as a criterion of being realized. The rewriting must
meet two constraints. First, x : trsc must occur in msg(n) if it is assumed to be
chosen there in GenAt(n, n2, x) or GenAt(n1, n, x). Second, x must not originate
at n if it is assumed non-originating.
Lemma 8 Suppose that B I-realizes A. Let T0 be the set of constants declared
of sort trsc in A, and let T ⊆ trsc be the set of transcendentals that I assigns
to T0. Let the set W0 of constants declared of sort fld occurring in A, and let
W ⊆ F be the image of W0 under I.
There exists a bundle B′ and an interpretation into B′ I ′ |= A such that I ′
maps constants declared with sort fld in A injectively to monomials of the form
(
∏
x∈T x
d)y where each x ∈ T , each d ∈ Z, and each y ∈ trsc \ T .
In the example above, we would like I ′(w) = x−1y.
Proof: By assumption 1, W consists of monomials, and let F0 be the base field.
By Def. 14, Clause 2a, the values in W are algebraically independent. The
values in W may involve the transcendentals T . However, when we divide
through by some
∏
x∈T x
d, we obtain a set W ′, whose members are still alge-
braically independent but T -free. Indeed, the map from W ′ to W is injective:
Otherwise, there are two members w1, w2 ∈W such that w1/w2 is a monomial
in members of T , contradicting their algebraic independence.
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The members of W ′ are T -free independent monomials, rather than just
transcendentals. Choose a set of transcendentals Y ⊆ trsc, disjoint from T , of
the same cardinality as W ′. Letting F1 be the smallest field including F0(T )
and W ′, Lemma 13 gives us an isomorphism J : F1 → F0(T, Y ).
We let B′ be the result of applying this J to B, and let I ′ = J ◦I. It is clear
that every regular strand in B′ is an instance of the same role as its preimage
in B; adversary webs are preserved when we replace any derivation of w ∈ W ′
by a one-step creation of J(w) ∈ Y . uunionsq
Lemma 9 Suppose B I-realizes A and I maps constants declared with sort fld
in A injectively to monomials of the form (
∏
x∈T x
d)y where each x ∈ T , d ∈ Z,
and y ∈ trsc \ T .
There is a σ : fld → term(LΠ) that maps constants declared of sort fld to
terms of LΠ of sort fld, such that σ(A) is derivable.
Moreover, σ is invertible.
In the example above, σ maps w to w′/x, which cancels out x in the reception
node, whose message now equals w′, which is certainly derivable.
Proof: Suppose that I maps each x : trsc to x ∈ trsc, w : fld to (∏x∈T xd)y ∈
F , etc. Define σ to act on each w, sending it w 7→ (∏x∈T xd)w′. We are
now interested in the interpretation J where J (w′) = y, etc. That is, every
constant of sort fld is interpreted by a distinct transcendental, disjoint from
those interpreting constants of sort trsc.
Thus, J (σ(w)) = J ((∏x∈T xd)w′) = (∏x∈T xd)y, so that J applied to σ(A)
yields the same results as I applied to A. Hence, B J -realizes σ(A).
Indeed, σ(A) is derivable, because, for each node, we can use the preimage
of the adversary web that derives in it B.
The inverse map τ divides by the product of the xs. The theory is unchanged
to within equalities it proves. uunionsq
Theorem 1 A is realized iff there exist σ, τ such that σ(A) is derivable and
τ(σ(A)) is the same theory as A.
Proof: By Lemmas 7–9. uunionsq
6 Tests and Cohorts
6.1 Solving tests
Our goal is to explain how to gradually enrich descriptions to identify the min-
imal, essentially different forms that they can take, which we call their shapes.
To find the principles for enrichments that lead to these shapes, we will isolate
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structural characteristics that are present in all bundles. When these charac-
teristics are absent, we will need to enrich a description to add them, and the
options for these enrichments provide the recipe driving cpsa’s execution.
So let B be a bundle for a protocol Π. Recall from Def. 7 that a unit is a
basic value or an encryption, but not a tuple. By an escape set, we mean a set
E of encryptions {|t|}K .
The central technique of cpsa is to consider how a unit c that has previously
been protected by an escape set E could have escaped from its protection.
We will say that c is protected by E in a particular message m iff every carried
path p = (m,pi) such that c = @p traverses some member of E. When there are
no carried paths p = (m,pi) such that c = @p then this is true (vacuously). We
will write c E m when c is protected by E in m.
When c E m, any adversary that possesses m and wants to obtain c, or any
message containing c in a non-E form, must either break through the protection
provided by E, or else build c separately.
Since these notions involve only paths through the free structure of the
message algebra, they remain the same whether we are talking about concrete
messages m ∈ Mc or formal terms t ∈ term(L). To formalize reasoning about
the cases when a value escapes, we define cuts. A cut in a bundle is a downward-
closed set of nodes in a bundle, like a lower Dedekind cut:
Definition 16 S ⊆ nodes(B) is a cut in B iff B is a bundle and, whenever
n2 ∈ S and n1 B n2, then n1 ∈ S.
When S is a cut in B, we call a node n ∈ nodes(B) \ S an upper node of S
in B. A node n is a minimal upper node of S in B iff it is an upper node of S,
and if n′ is an upper node of S in B and n′ B n, then n′ = n.
Lemma 10 Let B be a bundle, c a unit, and E a set of encryptions.
1. The set S = {n ∈ nodes(B) : ∀n′ B n . c E msg(n′)} is a cut in B.
2. If S has upper nodes in B, then S has minimal upper nodes in B.
3. If nu is a minimal upper node of S in B, then dir(nu) = + and there is
a path p = (msg(nu), pi) such that c = msg(nu) @ pi and p traverses no
member e ∈ E. Moreover, if nS ⇒+ nu, then nS ∈ S, so c E msg(nS).
We write esc(c, E,B) for the minimal upper nodes of this cut, since these nodes
cause c to escape from the protection of the encryptions E. We call c the critical
value of the cut.
Proof: 1. By the form of the definition, S is downward-closed. 2. By Lemma 1.
3. If the direction is −, then the matching earlier transmission contradicts
minimality. The path p exists by the definition of c E msg(n′). That nS ∈ S
holds follows by the assumption of minimality. uunionsq
By examining the forms of the adversary strands, we find:
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Theorem 2 Let: Π be a compliant protocol; B be a Π-bundle; n ∈ nodes(B);
E an escape set; p = (msg(n), pi) a carried path that traverses no e ∈ E; and
c = msg(n) @ pi be a unit. Then there exist nodes nu ∈ esc(c, E,B). Each nu is
either an adversary creation node or satisfies at least one of these cases:
Regular escape: nu is a regular node, and for each nS ⇒+ nu, c E msg(nS);
Breaking E: There is an encryption {|t|}K ∈ E and a transmission node nK
such that nK ≺ nu, and msg(nK) = K−1;
Forging c: c = {|t|}K is an encryption, and there is a transmission node nK
such that nK ≺ nu, and msg(nK) = K;
Field element: c ∈ F is a field element, with c visible in msg(nu), and every
x ∈ trsc present in c is visible before nu;
Group element: msg(nu) = c = g
µ ∈ C is a group element, and µ = ξν where
ν is a product of field values visible before nu, and either ξ = 1, or else
gξ is carried in a regular transmission node nr ≺ nu.
Proof: By Lemma 10, an escape node nu exists. If it lies on a regular strand,
the first case obtains. If nu is the last node of a decryption strand, the ciphertext
node must be a member of E; thus, the key node receives the decryption key
K−1. The matching transmission node nK satisfies the second case.
If nu is the last node of an encryption strand, that strand must create the
value c = {|t|}K ; the previous key node receives K, and the matching transmis-
sion node nK ≺ nu satisfies the third case. Pairing and separation strands do
not originate any unit, nor extract a unit from protection by E.
If c is a field or group element, Lemmas 4 or resp. 5 establish the claim. uunionsq
When c is a field or group element originating on an adversary node, then
the last two cases apply, resp. Otherwise, the first case or second case applies,
depending whether nu ∈ esc(c, E,B) is regular or not.
6.2 Cohorts enrich skeletons
When a user analyzes a protocol Π, she provides cpsa with the specification
of Π, and starts the analysis with a particular skeleton. cpsa’s job is to find
the minimal, essentially different derivable skeletons that enrich the starting
point [10, 16, 25].
At each point in the analysis, cpsa is operating with a fringe—a set of skele-
tons that are of interest, but have not yet been explored—and some shapes—
which are derivable skeletons already found. The algorithm (Fig. 12) to do the
analysis is finished if the fringe is empty, in which case the answer is the set of
shapes found so far. Otherwise, it chooses a skeleton A; if A is derivable it is
added to the shapes.
Otherwise, cpsa replaces A0 with a set of skeletons that are “closer” to
derivable skeletons. In doing so, we would like to make sure that no bundles are
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procedure analyze(fringe, shapes)
if fringe = ∅
then return shapes
else begin choose A from fringe in
if A is derivable
then analyze(fringe\A, shapes ∪{A})
else analyze((fringe ∪ cohort(A)) \ A, shapes)
end
Figure 12: cpsa Algorithm top level
lost. If A0 covers a bundle B, we want to make sure that one of the ways we
enrich A0 will continue to cover B. Thus, we seek a set of skeletons {A1, . . . ,Ak}
such that, for all i,B:
Ai  A0 A0 6 Ai B |= A0 =⇒ ∃j . B |= Aj
The first two assertions say that each Ai adds information. The last one says
that every bundle that remains covered. We call such a set {A1, . . . ,Ak} a
cohort.
An important case is k = 0, in which the cohort is the empty set. Since
the empty set covers no bundles, the last condition implies A0 also covers no
bundles; we have learnt that it may be discarded.
Thm. 2 justifies cpsa’s approach to generating cohorts, which appears in
Fig. 13.
When the cohort procedure is called, some node n is not derivable; so cpsa
selects one such, and moreover identifies a unit—not a tuple—as the critical
value t, and an escape set E.
t, E are chosen so that there is a carried path p from msg(n) to t = msg(n)@p
such that p traverses no member of E. Moreover, E is a set of encryptions such
that, for earlier transmissions n0 preceding n, t appears only protected within
the members of E in nodes msg(n0), which we wrote t E msg(n0) in Section 6.1.
Moreover, in E we collect the topmost encryptions {|m|}K in msg(n0) such that
t is carried within m and the decryption key K−1 is not derivable by n in A0.
E = ∅ holds if t was carried nowhere in transmissions prior to n. Thus, E did
protect t prior to n, but t is found outside of the protection of E in n itself.
Prior versions of cpsa computed skeletons in which an instance of a regular
node transmits t outside E; in which the adversary breaks the escape set E by
obtaining a decryption key K−1, possibly with the help of additional regular be-
havior; in which the adversary may be able to forge t = {|m|}K by obtaining K;
and in which a substitution applicable to A0 contracts A0, equating encryptions
on paths to t with members of E.
In this last case, the test in A disappears before the covered bundles are
reached, so they do not need to offer any solution for it.
The remaining two clauses ensure that the cohort continues to cover bundles
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procedure cohort(A)
choose n from non-derivable(nodes(A)) in
choose t, E from critical-and-escape(n, A) in
let regular = regular-trans(t, E, n,A) in
let break = break-escape(E,n,A) in
let forge = forge-by-key(t, n,A) in
let contract = contract-away-test(t, E, n,A) in
let field = if t : fld
then choose x : trsc ∈ consts(t) in
{ add-fld-deriv(x, t, n,A), add-absence(x, t, n,A)}
else ∅ in
let group = if t : grp
then choose w : fld 6∈ consts(A) in
{ add-grp-deriv(w, t, n,A)}
else ∅ in
return (regular ∪ break ∪ forge ∪ field ∪ group ∪ contract)
Figure 13: The cpsa Cohort Algorithm
in which field and group elements c originate on adversary nodes. They rely
on Lemmas 4–5 to add information to cover these DH cases. In each case, we
express this information by additional formulas in the resulting skeletons.
Lemma 11 Cohort case, Group member. Let t : grp be a critical value
in n ∈ nodes(A), and w : fld be a constant not appearing in A. Let Φ be the
sentence:
DerBy(n, exp(t, 1/w)) ∧ DerBy(n,w).
The group cohort for t, n,A is the singleton {A ∪ {Φ}}. Moreover, A ∪ {Φ}
covers every B that A covers.
Proof: Suppose that A I-covers a bundle B, in which I(t) originates prior to
I(n) on an adversary node. Then, by Lemma 5, there is a monomial ν which
is a product of transcendentals visible before I(n), and—assuming (I(t))1/ν is
distinct from g—the latter was previously visible in B. Thus, we may extend
the interpretation I by assigning w 7→ ν, satisfying both conjuncts of Φ. uunionsq
Lemma 12 Cohort case, Field member. Let t : fld be a critical value in
n ∈ nodes(A); let x : trsc be a constant appearing in t. Let Φ,Ψ (resp.) be the
sentences:
DerBy(n, x) and Absent(x, t).
The field cohort t, n,A is the pair {A ∪ {Φ}, A ∪ {Ψ}}. If A covers B, then
either A ∪ {Φ} or A ∪ {Ψ} covers B.
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Proof: Suppose that A I-covers a bundle B, in which I(t) originates prior to
I(n) on an adversary node. If I(x) is present in the monomial I(t), then by
Lemma 4 I(x) is visible in a node preceding I(n). Thus, formula Φ is satisfied
in B. Otherwise, by Lemma 4, formula Ψ is satisfied in B. uunionsq
Thus, the procedures add-fld-deriv(x, t, n,A) and add-absence(x, t, n,A) add
these two properties Φ and Ψ respectively, and return the resulting skeletons.
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A Appendix: Algebraic independence
We say that a number of values in a field are algebraically independent when
any polynomial in them that evaluates to 0 is identically 0.
Definition 17 Suppose that F0 is any field. Values v1, . . . , vn ∈ F0 are alge-
braically independent in F0 iff, for every polynomial p in n variables x1, . . . , xn,
if the value of p for [x1 7→ v1, . . . , xn 7→ vn] is 0, then p is the identically 0 poly-
nomial.
Lemma 13 Suppose that F0 is any field, and W is a set of field extension
elements. Let v1, . . . , vn ∈ F0(W ) be algebraically independent values in which
extension elements from W occur non-vacuously. Let Y = {y1, . . . , yn} be field
extension elements disjoint from F0 and W . Let F1 be the minimal extension
of F0 containing v1, . . . , vn.
There is a field homomorphism from F1 onto F0(Y ).
B Efficient Unification
Author of this appendix: John D. Ramsdell. Date: February, 2014.
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This appendix describes how cpsa performs efficient unification. The focus is
solely on Diffie-Hellman exponents, as the remainder of the algorithm is straight-
forward. The notation used is from the chapter on unification theory in Hand-
book of Automated Reasoning [2, Chap. 5]. The reader should have this text
available while reading this section.
Terms in the exponents satisfy AG , the equations for a free Abelian group.
To better match cited material, we use additive notation for the group. The
binary operation is +, constant 0 is the identity element, and − is the unary
inverse operation. The binary operation + is left associative so that x+y+ z =
(x+ y) + z. The equational identities for an Abelian group are
x+ 0 ≈ x Unit element U
x+−x ≈ 0 Inverse element I
x+ y ≈ y + x Commutativity C
x+ y + z ≈ x+ (y + z) Associativity A
The normal form of term t is c1x1 + c2x2 + · · ·+ cnxn, where ci is a non-zero
integer, and for c > 0, cx abbreviates x+ x+ · · ·+ x summed c times while for
c < 0, cx abbreviates −((−c)x). Every term has a normal form.
There are efficient algorithms for unification modulo AG [2, Section 5.1].
cpsa uses an algorithm that reduces the problem to finding integer solutions to
an inhomogeneous linear equation with integer coefficients. The equation solver
used is from The Art of Computer Programming [22, Pg. 327].
In the order sorted signature for our free Abelian group, there are two
sorts, G and B with B < G, and no operations or equations specific to sort B.
The unsorted algebra isomorphic to the sorted algebra adds a unary inclusion
operation b to the signature. For term t, we write t¯ for b(t). A term t is
constrained if it occurs as t¯. Because problems in this algebra are derived from
the order-sorted algebra, terms have a restricted form. Whenever t¯ occurs in
a term, t is a variable. Furthermore, when variable x is constrained, it occurs
everywhere in the term in the form x¯. For example, the term x+ x¯ is ill-formed.
Thus the normal form of a term is c1x1 + c2x2 + · · · + cmxm + cm+1x¯m+1 +
cm+2x¯m+2 + · · ·+ cnx¯n.
Combination of Unification Algorithms. Section 6.1 of the Handbook [2]
describes a general method for combining unification algorithms. Let A+ be
the theory associated with the Abelian group, and Bb := {x¯ ≈ x¯}, so that
E = A+ ∪Bb. Obviously, =Bb is just syntactic equality. The “dummy” identity
x¯ ≈ x¯ ensures that b belongs to the signature of Bb.
An E-unification problem is written t =?E t
′. A reduced unification problem
is one in which t contains no constrained variables, t′ contains no unconstrained
variables, and t and t′ are in normal form. Any E-unification problem can
converted into a reduced E-unification problem.
To convert the reduced problem into decomposed form, a fresh variable vi is
generated for each constrained variable x¯i in t
′. When t′ = c1x¯1 + c2x¯2 + · · ·+
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cnx¯n, the decomposed form is
{t− c1v1 − c2v2 − · · · − cnvn ?=
A+
0, v1
?
=
Bb
x¯1, v2
?
=
Bb
x¯2, . . . , vn
?
=
Bb
x¯n},
where x− cy abbreviates x+ (−c)y.
For this problem, the shared variables are the fresh variables vi introduced
during decomposition. Each shared variable is labeled with theory Bb. The
ordering of shared variables is irrelevant because of the simple nature of the
equations in theory Bb. The only source of non-determinism is the partitioning
of the shared variables.
Example 1
{z ?=
E
x¯− y¯}
{z − v0 + v1 ?=
A+
0, v0
?
=
Bb
x¯, v1
?
=
Bb
y¯} Decomposed form
{{v0}, {v1}} Partition
{z ≈ x¯− y¯, v0 ≈ x¯, v1 ≈ y¯} Solution
Example 2
{0 ?=
E
w¯ + x¯− y¯ − z¯}
{v0 + v1 − v2 − v3 ?=
A+
0, v0
?
=
Bb
w¯, v1
?
=
Bb
x¯, v2
?
=
Bb
y¯, v3
?
=
Bb
z¯} Decomposed form
{{v0, v2}, {v1, v3}} Partition
{w ≈ y, x ≈ z, . . .} Solution
To find the other solution, {w ≈ z, x ≈ y}, use the partition {{v0, v3}, {v1, v2}}.
Efficient Unification Algorithm. The issue surrounding an efficient imple-
mentation is the fast generation of the fewest variable partitions required to
generate a complete set of unifiers. A means to reduce the amount of non-
determinism in this algorithm is reported in [21]. The paper provides a method
to intertwine equation solving with making decisions about non-deterministic
choices.
The only kinds of decisions used here are equality/disequality decisions for
constrained variables. For constrained variables x and y, we write x
.
= y for the
decision to equate x and y, and x 6 .= y for the decision to keep them distinct.
Let σ and θ be substitutions, and D be a set of decisions. To compute a
complete set of unifiers for problem t =? t′, compute unify(t =? t′, ∅, Id) where
unify(t =? t′, D, θ) is
1. if σ is an A+-unifier for t =
? t′ obtained by treating constrained variables
as constants then return {σθ};
2. else return unify ′(t =? t′, D, θ).
Function unify ′(t =? t′, D, θ) is
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1. if all distinct pairs of constrained variables have a decision in D then
return ∅;
2. else choose variables x and y without a decision in D and return
unify(t =? t′{x 7→ y}, D ∪ {x .= y}, θ{x 7→ y}) ∪
unify ′(t =? t′, D ∪ {x 6 .= y}, θ).
The algorithm can further be improved by changing function unify so that
when A+-unification fails, the results of the steps up to the failure are applied
to the recursive call so as to avoid repeating these steps. This refinement is due
to [26, Chapter 8]. To justify this refinement, one must show that constrained
variable identification does not invalidate any previous A+-unification steps.
To implement this refinement, we assume the equation is in reduced form
and replace unify with unify0, which expands the A+-unification algorithm. For
equation, t =? t′ let t =
∑n
i=1 cixi and t
′ =
∑m
j=1 dj y¯j .
Function unify0(t =
? t′, D, θ) is
1. let ci be the smallest coefficient in absolute value;
2. if ci < 0 then return unify0(−t =? −t′, D, θ);
3. else if ci = 1 then return {σθ} where σ = {xi 7→
∑m
j dj y¯j −
∑n
k 6=i ckxk};
4. else if ci divides every coefficient in c then
(a) if c1 divides every coefficient in d then divide c and d by ci and goto
step 3;
(b) else return unify ′(t =? t′, D, θ);
5. else eliminate xi in favor of freshly created variable xn+1 using σ = {xi 7→
xn+1 −
∑
k 6=i(ck/ci)xk} and then return unify0(t′′ =? t′, D, σθ) where
t′′ = cixn+1 +
∑
k(ck mod ci)xk.
Constrained variable identification does not invalidate any previous A+-
unification steps because gcd(di, dj) divides di + dj .
There is another opportunity for performance improvement by refining func-
tion unify ′. It could inspect the coefficients of constrained variables when de-
ciding which constrained variables to identify. This refinement has yet to be
explored.
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